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ABSTRACT
This study examines the televised political imagemaking of Louis Lambert during his unsuccessful 1979
Louisiana gubernatorial campaign.

During the campaign,

over $20 million was spent by the six major candidates
for the office of governor.

Lambert spent approximately

$3.5 million, with the majority of his money being spent
on televised advertisements.
The study includes an overview of Lambert's campaign,
followed by an analysis of his campaign.

The three dif

ferent phases of the campaign and the three media con
sultants Lambert employed is analyzed.

The study also

examines the verbal and non-verbal aspects of Lambert’s
political commercials.
The study revealed that political image-making is
an important factor in a campaign.

Moreover, the nega

tive image a candidate projects can possibly have worse
effect on an individual's candidacy than a positive image.
The study also contends that additional aspects of po
litical communication, such as campaign organization,
direct-mail, phone banks, polling, and campaign strategy,
work together with the image-making aspect to strengthen
a campaign.

iv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1950's there has been a proliferation
1
in the use of television by candidates for public office.
More and more the politician is becoming dependent on TV as
the principal medium for presenting his platform and, equal
ly important, his image, to the electorate.
As to the latter, television in political campaigns
frequently raises the argument that the focus has shifted
from issues to image.

To analyze this argument properly,

one needs to reflect on pre-television days, when issues
were supposedly the main focus.
Emmett J. Hughes claims that image has always been an
important criterion.

"Personality has always mattered

critically in politics - back through the age of radio to
the street-corner rally and the doorbell-ringing campaigns."
Dan Hahn contends that "the focus has always been upon im
age, or upon image as a manifestation of the issues ... When
a voter cast his ballot for "The Great Commoner," he was
voting for image-plus, he was voting for a whole series of
issues which were somehow tied in with the image ... When
a person cast a vote in 1960 for the "mature" Nixon or the
"vigorous" Kennedy, he was voting for an image intimately
3
connected with the issue of leadership."

1

2

A candidate's use of image is a part of his type of
persuasion.

Political consultants attempt to build a de

sirable impression of their candidates.

The vote-winning

capacity of a particular candidate’s image centers on
those qualities which he or she believes will constitute
a desirable impression, and the ability to convince voters
that the candidate has those qualities.
Political researchers who have analyzed the literature
concerning opinion polls and surveys find that the candi
date 's experience is the most important characteristic,
with integrity, honesty, education, and intelligence fol
lowing.

Also listed as significant qualities are indepen

dence, leadership, administrative ability, aggressiveness,
youth, attractive personality, sincerity, and "a stable
4
family life."
The 1950's marked the beginning of the television com5

mercial's ability to shape a candidate's image. Dwight D.
Eisenhower is considered the first television candidate
because of his image as portrayed through that medium.
Television's influence in image-making was also evident in
the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign.
The dominant feature in that campaign was the candi
date 's series of debates.

Their colloquies provided re

searchers the opportunity to test television's effective
ness in presenting a candidate.

In one such study, by

Elihu Katz and Jacob J. Feldman, the researchers concluded

3

that viewers did not get sufficient information from the
debates to cause them to change their choice.

However,

viewers had "learned something about the candidates them
selves.

They discovered how well each candidate could
g

perform in a debate, and the images of each candidate."
Television commercials are only one of many stimuli
acting on the voter, but apparently they are one of the
strongest influences on the voter's decision.

The candidate

is no longer a man alone, but rather a member of a group
organized to accomplish the task of communicating. An im
portant member of that group is the media consultant whose
function is to communicate the image of the candidate to
the voter through the medium of advertising.
METHOD
This is a descriptive analetic study regarding the
televised commercials aired during Louis Lambert's 1979
gubernatorial campaign.
experimental study.

This does not purport to be an

Data were gathered through inter

views and from literature on the topic.

Since the in

terviews were with media consultants, people involved with
a particular campaign, and politically astute individuals,
the study borders on field research.

Interviews were con

ducted with political media consultants James Carvin of
New Orleans, Louisiana and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, and Roger Ailes of New York, New York; with
Lambert's campaign manager, Frank Brown and his campaign

4

director, Gary O'Neill; with Wayne Davis, media director
for Gillis Long's 1971 gubernatorial campaign, with Nancy
Todd, secretary for Matt Reese and Associates of Washing
ton, D. C.; with long-time political consultant Edmond
Reggie of Crowley, Louisiana; with polling expert Jim
Lloyd of Lance Terrance and Associates of Dallas, Texas;
and with political researcher and writer James Gray of
Washington, D. C.
In the concluding chapter, the writer makes impres
sionistic observations concerning the effectiveness of
image-making in Lambert's campaign.

The conclusions

drawn are based primarily from the information gained
through the interviews and past research in the area of
political image-making.

The writer's judgments and

opinions are simple observations of the political com
mercials .
The specific purpose of the study is to analyze the
image-making techniques of televised political commercials
used in Louis Lambert's 1979 gubernatorial campaign.
The potential exists for television news coverage, or
"free" media, to have a significant impact on a candidate's
image.

News reporting may either contradict or enhance

an image the candidate is attempting to project through his
political advertisement, and the news media can certainly
7
influence voters. Gerald Ford's 1976 presidential campaign,
for example, underscores this point.

His stumbling while

leaving an airplane was reported as a clumsy action, creat-

5

ing a contradiction to the image Ford had been trying to
establish.

His stumbling was in sharp contrast to his

cultivated image as a distinguished and gracious leader.
Hofstetter and Buss remind us that news reporting
8
may also be biased. They state that bias in reporting
may consist of outright lying, distortion, aggregating
and diffusing certain facts but not others, or disagree9
ment over basic values or beliefs. A significant polit
ical characteristic of television is its power to estab
lish an image of an individual.

Since researchers gen

erally agree that TV can promote a certain image of a
10
candidate,
news reporting can also affect the image the
electorate has of the candidate.

Due to the differences

in structure and intended purposes of political advertising
and news reporting and to the vast scope of the latter,
the respective contributions of these two forms of polit
ical communication can not feasibly be analyzed in the
same study.

Thus, the present study is limited in scope

to the analysis of the political advertisements during
Lambert1s campaign.
Lambert's campaign did not follow a pre-planned
media strategy as to viewer targeting.

Consequently, the

Lambert organization apparently kept no record of their
media time purchases.

Also, attempts to obtain this in

formation from broadcasting stations throughout the state
proved unsuccessful.

For the purpose of this study, the

6

potential audience viewing Lambert's advertisements will
be defined as the registered voters in Louisiana in 1979.
According to the census data in 1979, of the voting-age
population, 1.9 million or 70%, were registered to vote.

11

Therefore, the potential viewing audience is the 1.9 million
registered Louisiana voters during 1979.
A political commercial is a message that is aired in
a time period purchased by a candidate. The commercial is
frequently limited in time to 10, 20, 30 or 60 seconds. The
concentration here is on 30 and 60 second commercials, since
these were the prime basic units used by each media consul
tant.

The study focuses on the verbal and non-verbal mes

sages and the images communicated to the Louisiana electorate.
Chapter II includes a review of literature on the
topic of political image-making.

The literature includes

texts on the subject matter, interviews with professionals
in the area of image-making, journal articles, and news
papers.

This chapter also focuses on political research.

Chapter III includes an overview of the entire cam
paign. This chapter also includes an historical sketch of
Louis Lambert - his background, his past political involve
ment and his reasons for seeking the office of governor.
Lambert recognized the important role his media con
sultants would play in the campaign. However, during the
course of the campaign, Lambert was forced to employ three
different consultants.

Each consultant was instrumental

in shaping a new image of Lambert.

It therefore seems

7

important that the work of each consultant is analyzed.
A brief description of the consulting firms is provid
ed in order to better understand the personalities behind
the image makers. This chapter includes a descriptive an
alysis of Lambert's paid political advertisements and the
effectiveness of these advertisements.

Finally, attention

is given to the reasons for the dismissal of the consultants.
Chapter IV also provides an overview of the primary
election results*

An analysis of the court battle that

followed the primary election and the four Democrat can
didates who endorsed the Republican candidate is included.
This examination reveals the severe problems the Lambert
campaign encountered prior to the general election. The
Chapter also examines the third consulting firm involved in
the campaign and the reasons for hiring this firm.
Chapter V is a content analysis of the verbal and
non-verbal aspect of the political commercials.

The var

ious aesthetic techniques employed by the media consultants
are analyzed.
Chapter VI is the conclusion of the study and includes
an overall analysis of Lambert's campaign for governor.
Attention will be given to the strengths and weaknesses of
his organization and his campaign. This chapter provides
a final examination of the effectiveness of the numerous
television advertisements on the images which were being
communicated to the Louisiana electorate.

8
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
It is necessary to review several bodies of literature
in order to place the present work properly within the
existing body of knowledge.
This review is highly selective and is not intended
to be a comprehensive coverage of selected areas.

The re

view is intended to provide a basis- for the development of
this study of political image-making.
Great men, even during their life
time, are usually known to the public
only through a fictitious personality.
Hence the modicum of truth in the old
saying that no man is a hero to his
valet. There is only a modicum of
truth, for the valet, and the private
secretary, are often immersed in the
fiction themselves. Royal personages
are, of course, constructed personal
ities. Whether they themselves be
lieve in their character, or whether
they merely permit the chamberlain
to stage - manaae it, there are at
least two distinct selves, the public
and the regal self, the private and
human. 1
2
Images, "the pictures in our heads,"
are of increased
concern in the study of political communication.
is an individual's cognitive attribute.
ory, a belief, an opinion or an attitude.

An image

It may be a mem3

Moreover, an

image is "a subjective representation of something previously perceived,"

4

' the "conception of qualities that

people associate with certain objects, products, or indi
viduals." ^

In a word, images are mental pictures which
9

10

people use the better to comprehend the world around them.
These mental pictures are, in turn, shaped and provoked by
6
our personal attitudes and feelings.
It seems as though we are living in a world where the
image is of more importance than the original, which has
itself become the original....
substance."

7

The shadow has become the

In past political elections, the politician's

ideals have frequently been displaced by images.

The im

age, writes David Boorstin, "is a pseudo-image ... it is
synthetic, believable, passive, vivid, simplified, and
g

ambiguous."

For the purpose of this study, an "image" is

the mental pictures the electorate has of the political
candidate.
The political actions of individuals seem to be "found
ed by the images of political reality ... which we carry
9
around with us."
Moreover, individuals seem to treat im
ages like the environment itself.

Their actions appear to

be governed by "an image of the present in which the act oc
curs, an image of the past preceding the act, and an image
10
of the future subsequent to the act.
Individuals involved in the political arena should al
so focus attention on image.

Kenneth Boulding noted that a

candidate's image consists of the subjective impressions
that the voters have of him.

"These impressions can be of

any type - thoughts about a candidate's values and campaign
successes are as much a part of his image as are ideas about
.11
his personality and leadership."

11

Stephen Shadegg, a special consultant and active mem
ber of the Republican National Committee, advanced this
concept of a candidate's image: "The image of a candidate
is the public appreciation of the candidate's personality,
philosophy, intelligence, competence, and performance
record.

The image is what the public sees, knows, and be12
lieves about the candidate."
However, political images
are a complicated combination of information and evaluation
and are often difficult to separate.
When an individual views a televised advertisement, he
may have a different impression of a candidate. An individ
ual's impression of a candidate can be either stylistic or
13
political.
Stylistic impressions are associated with the
candidate's mannerisms and campaign performances.

This in

cludes such factors as the candidate's personality, campaign
success and style, and personal background.

Conversely, po

litical impressions are concerned with the candidate’s govern14
ing actions and capacities such as his issue position.
An example illustrating the difference between stylist
ic and political impressions is the Gerald Ford-Jimmy Carter
1976 presidential campaign.

Ford's image was primarily po

litical, as the electorate's impressions focused on his pres
idential tenure, leadership, and political actions. During
the campaign, however, these impressions were downplayed,
while stylistic impressions, such as his personality, were
emphasized.
Carter's impression focused on the stylistic, rather

12

than the political.

His personality, reflecting his back

ground, was a positive factor that aided him throughout
the campaign.
A candidate's image will not be significantly changed
by new information, once the image has been developed.
"The developed image will limit the impact of subsequent
15
news about the candidate."
IMAGE RESEARCH AMD POLITICAL POLLS
According to nationally prominent political advertiser
Douglas L. Bailey, "political campaigns these days live
16
with polls, maybe too many polls."
The winning candidate
is usually the one who most effectively responds to the con
cerns of his constituency.

Therefore, it seems the most ef

fective means of learning their concerns is through opinion
research.
In developing campaign strategy, the candidate's re
search staff must consider both issues and image.

In 1978,

research revealed that voters best remembered the issues
17
from past campaigns.
Prior to the election, however, image
was more important than issues in shaping voter attitude.
When speaking on an issue, the candidate should use that
issue as a means to portray the intended image to the
voters.18
Political polls and opinion surveys, if properly con
ducted and analyzed, can be effective tools for giving
the candidate reliable information as to what is going on
19
in the minds of the voters.
As political pollster Lance

13

Terrance points out, most surveys provide answers to such
pertinent questions as: What are the key issues in the
election?

How many voters know of the candidate?

number, is their opinion good, bad or indifferent?
they like, or dislike the candidate, why?
opinion of the other candidates?

Of this
If

What is their

If the election were

today, how would it come out?

Where do the voters get
20
most of their political information? ' All such questions
provide the pollster with information useful in planning
the campaign strategy.
Various methods of sampling are available to the
pollsters.
Two common types are "probability” and "quota"
21
sampling. Probability sampling assumes that the individ
uals selected for interview are representative of the en
tire population within the candidate's geographical re
gions .
Population quota sampling involves the analysis of
census data to identify the distribution by such charac
teristics as age, sex, income and education.

Quota sam

pling also enables the pollster to achieve equal repre22
sentation of the designed population.
The information gathering process begins once the
subjects for survey are selected.

Questions put to the

respondents can be either open-ended or close-ended and ■
can be presented to the respondent by mail, by telephone
or in person.

23

Survey research involves various stages.

First, the

14

project preparation should include several considerations,
such as hypothesizing (deciding what will be studied),
designing (establishing procedures and methods to be used),
planning (determining materials and personnel needs), and
financing (arranging support for the survey).

Second, the

sample selection technique is determined for choosing those
people to be interviewed.
be prepared.

Third, the questionnaire must

Questionnaire construction includes drafting

(framing the questions for use in the field) and construc
tion (planning the format of the questionnaire).

Fourth,

the field work, which includes pre-testing, training of
interviewers, briefing, interviewing, controlling and
verifying.

The final stage is data processing, which in

cludes coding, processing, analyzing and reporting the
24
data.
When the polls are completed, and the results tabu
lated, the staff can begin further organization of the
campaign.

Robert Agranoff explains various types of in

formation pollster Lou Harris found useful in planning cam25
paign strategy.
Key group breakdowns, for example, will in
dicate the political makeup of the constituency, including
area differences, racial and religious patterns, nationality,
group differences, occupational patterns, differences by
size and place and how past elections were decided.
Polls also give campaign planners an indication of
the public's perception of the candidate as a public figure,
the candidate's name recognition, past voting record (if

15

any), and the candidate1s favorable and unfavorable quali26
ties.
Political polls provide information indicating the
public's opinion of issues and problems they consider most
urgent.

Finally, the researcher obtains information neces

sary to develop the proper image, to shape the candidate's
27
personality into one pleasing to the voters.
Various factors are merged in formulating a candidate's
overall image: the candidate's partisanship, position on
issues, public perception of the candidate's competence,
28
and the candidate's personality.
If a positive character
istic be considered lacking, the media consultant in his
planning should work with the candidate to correct the de
ficiency.
ELEMENTS SHAPING A CANDIDATE'S IMAGE
Political images consist of individuals' subjective
impressions, which include the public's perception of their
elected official's campaign successes, personality traits,
and leadership abilities.

Also significant are their ap

pearances, philosophies, intelligence, competence, and per29
formance records.
It must be kept in mind that politicians
are viewed as concerned, friendly, honest, or, at the other
end, indifferent, unfriendly, dishonest.

Unfortunately,

these impressions are frequently based on hasty judgements,
inaccurate or incomplete information, biases, and distortion
30
of motives or actions.
Various elements work together to
create ethos - the distinguishing character or tone of a

16

person or group conveyed at a given time.

31

If politicians

implement methods of strengthening their credibility, for
example, the credibility element of their ethos will improve.
Other elements which shape the ethos are: character and trust
worthiness, intelligence, identification and attractiveness,
or charisma.32
Political scandals and unethical activities, such as
Watergate, Abscam, and Brilab, have caused the public to care
fully scrutinize the actions of their elected leaders and
have made them more watchful for any trace of political manip
ulation or deceit.

Politicians must therefore be sure in

their campaigns that their actions and words emphasize their
good character and trustworthiness, and that their abiding
interest is in meeting the needs of the electorate.

Any trace

of self-serving action, hidden motives, or undercover deals
cannot but damage the candidate’s, or elected official's,
credibility and, hence, his image.
Similarly, the politician’s character can be strength
ened or weakened by the degree to which he displays sincerity. 33 According to media specialist Gene Wyckoff, sincerity
34
is viewed as even more preferable than skill.
People are
more "tolerant of bumbles and obvious ineptness if the indi35
vidual tries hard."
A second factor contributing to the politicians' cred36
ibility is intelligence.
They must appear knowledgeable
concerning current and relevant issues, both general and
particular.
Although public officials need not be considered "ex

17
perts," they should still be viewed as competent, and al37
most as important, self-confident.
Studies reveal that a
source's competence is effective in influencing the recep38
tion of that source's idea.
Each time they display success
in performing a task, their image of self-confidence can be
enhanced.
Another important characteristic that strengthens the
39
politician's credibility is identification with the audience.
He should always analyze the audience in order to gain better
understanding of its composition.

According to Kenneth

Burke, politicians are persuasive insofar as they talk their
audience's language - by speech, gesture, tonality, image,
40
and attitude - by identifying with their audience's way.
When such identification is achieved, politicians ap
pear to share common values with their audience and this seems
to increase their credibility.

A good example of this was

the immense success of John F. Kennedy's speech in West Berlin
in the early 1960's.

Kennedy won the hearts of those assem

bled by stating, in German, "Ich bin cin Berliner."

(I am a

Berliner).
Another example of the importance of identification was
provided by Louisiana's legendary governor, Huey P. Long.
In his travels through various section of Louisiana in the
early thirties, Long successfully identified with the different
groups by his dress and his accent.

When speaking to a group

of poor, uneducated farm workers, he wore casual slacks and
spoke with a slightly broken accent. But, when addressing a

18

group of prominent New Orleans business executives, he would
wear a suit and necktie and speak at the intellectual level
of his audience.

Such audience adaptation appeared to be a

significant element in Long's success.

By identifying with

them appearing like them, being one of them, he strengthened
his credibility.
Credibility also allows the politician's ideas to be
more readily accepted.

41

By touching the emotions of the

electorate, political officials can communicate a more per
sonalized message.

For example, instead of just talking Med

icare, one could cite a specific case of a father, mother or
other needy person benefited by Medicare.

Instead of speak

ing of Hubert Humphrey's record, one could emphasize how the
vice-president's work related to the peole and the national
42

welfare.
A final element of credibility is attraction, or charis43

ma.

The attraction of a candidate refers to the orientation

toward another person or persons; it involves a psychological
approach, rather than avoidance; moving toward someone, rather than against or away from them.

44

Politicians' attraction

can come from their observable talents, achievement, occupa
tional status, personality and appearance, style, and over45

all life experience.
A public official's interaction results in the public's
formulation of two different impressions - stylistic and po46

litical.

Stylistic impressions refer to the official's po

litical mannerisms and performances.

This includes such fact

ors as the politician's personality, personal background,

19

and campaign techniques.
The politician's image transmitted during his run for
office usually becomes a part of him, because of the greater
amount of his exposure during the campaign.

The degree of

forcefulness, consideration, and sportsmanship exhibited by
the official provides valuable information to the public and
47
contributes to his public's image.
Therefore, by being al
ways conscious of his campaign behavior, the politician may
avoid the "creation" of information that the public may mis
interpret.
Political impressions focus on the politician's govern
ing actions and capacities, such as leadership, and ability,
48
political background and issue positions.
For example, the
electorate had a negative political impression of Jimmy Carter
during his presidency because they perceived him to be lack
ing qualities as a leader.

As a result, a great part of his

1980 campaign was spent in his effort to strengthen this quali
ty.

Decisions such as the Tehran raid, as well-intentioned as

they may have been, were generally considered also to be at
tempts to erase his poor leadership impression.
The politician's physical delivery can be an important
49
ingredient of his charisma.
Politicians' delivery can pro
ject an aura of crediblity by allowing their ideas to have
maximum impact.

The public official should be aware that good

delivery reinforces the speaker's ideas. It should appear not
obtrusive, but natural and spontaneous, and be appropriate for
50
the audience and the occasion.
Ronald Reagan's performance in the 1980 debate illus-

20

trates the role of good delivery in strengthening a poli
tician's image.

He employed various physical techniques to

erase his negative image as a "dangerous" candidate.

His

use of "shrugs and smiles seemed to convince the public
that Carter's portrait of Reagan that of a weapon-prone,
51

right winger, was a political caricature."

He reinforced

his message by using such simple devices as the waving of
his hand and direct eye contact, thus indicating that non
verbal behavior, too, can strengthen both the politician's
message and his image.
Also vital to the politician's attempt to project a
positive image are his mannerisms, physical appearance,
and dress.
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illustration.

Here again the Reagan-Carter debates provide an
Reagan usually wore a dark, two-piece suit

and a dark tie, the traditional attire of presidents. This,
coupled with his large stature (compared with Carter's)
seemed greatly to aid his creation of a "presidential image."
His physical appearance was so imposing that even some of
Carter's aides conceded that Reagan's presence was Superior,
was more that of a man to be called "Mr. President."
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In contrast, Carter wore a more stylish blue suit,
red and white tie, and a gold collar pin.

Rather than

appearing "presidential" his appearance was more that of a
businessman.

Seen next to Reagan, he appeared smaller,

almost fragile, which seemed to emphasize the strong and
authoritative figure of his opponent.
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Good vocal delivery can also enhance the politician's
image.

In their interaction with the public, the politi

cian's vocal style, articulation, speech tempo, and pro34
•
nunciation can be persuasive. Several qualities are pres
ent in good vocal delivery..
sufficiently loud and

First, the volume must be

the tempo, or rate , slow enough to

be heard without difficulty.

Second, the delivery must

be such as to create interest in the message.

Third, the

vocal manner should contribute to the mood the speaker
seeks to create.and not distract the listeners.
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The Ted Kennedy-John McCormack senatorial debate in
the 1960's exemplifies the importance of vocal delivery.
As the debate became more heated, McCormack's image began
to diminish; "the tone and aggressive intent of McCormick's
remarks seemed to characterize him as an unpleasant and
undesirable image candidate."
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Accordingly, politicians should look to both their
verbal and non-verbal behavior.

In all situations, whether

social or political, the politician can be judged by his
gestures, mannerisms, and utterances which could be sub
ject to public scrutiny.
The public official's image, synonymous with the
people’s overall impression of the official, can often de
termine the future of the political career.

Therefore,

ethos translates into a politician’s being positively per
ceived by his audience, the voters.

It is evident, there

fore, that to be successful in the political arena, poli-

22

ticians should recognize, understand and seek to control
all the elements that make for a good image.
IMPORTANCE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN IMAGE-MAKING
Research has been conducted concerning the effect of
mass media on the viewing public.

The major conclusion in

dicates that what the listener, viewer, or reader brings in
to the media situation (his background and preconceived
motions) is a much more important determinant of media im57
pact than anything in the media themselves.
His is a per
ception of the image of the particular media source.
Political participants themselves have recognized the
importance of the candidate's image in a campaign and the
significant role the various media play in the image-making
process.

There is among them, however, disagreement as

to the most effective medium for political communication.
A study by Atwood and Sanders noted considerable var58
iance in audience perceptions of media use and credibility.
Keating and Latane refer to a Roper study which found that
from 1959 to 1971 TV had overtaken newspapers as the source
from which most people received their news. TV was also
59
the most believable medium.
The Roper study compared
television, radio, newspapers, and magazines and found
television to be the most believable and desirable medium.
The study showed that 65% of respondents received most in
formation on candidates through television, which 24%
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selected newspapers, and 4% radio.
Prior to television and radio, the most important
component of a candidate's image was probably his personal
character and reputation, as depicted by newspapers, pam61
phlets, posters, and campaign slogans. The advancement of
communication technology, however, has changed the art of
political campaigning.
Newspapers are more informative than television.
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Studies revealed that in the 1968 and 1972 presidential
campaigns more people reported voting for the candidate
espoused by newspapers than those promoted by other media.
The studies also revealed that newspapers seem more ef
fective because they eliminate confusing arguments of
63
campaigns.
Granting that newspapers are a highly informative
source, there is question concerning their effectiveness.
Media specialist Gene Wyckoff argues that newspapers are
less influential than television in conveying a candidate's
64
image. He claims that readers derive their image of the
candidate’s character from descriptions of their deeds and
reputation, whereas viewers judge character from directly
perceived appearance and demeanor.

Furthermore, says Wy

ckoff, television images are more effective because they are
perceived directly, whereas newspaper images must be de
rived by indirect perceptual process: the reader first
sees printed data and

then, through his cognitive pro

cesses interprets the data; only then can he formulate an
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fk ^

image from the printed data.

On the other hand./ some indi

viduals claim newspapers to be the most effective conveyance
66

of a candidate’s image.

According to Thomas Patterson, "the
67
newspaper is the superior transmitter of information.
Throughout the 1940’s, radio was the most trusted and
popular political medium in America; but with the upsurge
of television in the fifties, radio's political appeal de68

clined significantly.

Today, although not as frequently

used as the other media, radio is effective in reaching
those audiences generally missed by newspapers and tele
vision.

According to Dan Nimmo, the average suburban com

muter spends ninety minutes of every working day in his
69
car. Millions of housewives listen to radio while doing
their chores

and many of the elderly, who grew up with

the radio, still rely on its news broadcasts for informa
tion about politics.7^3
Selection of the vehicle for communicating a politi
cal message is frequently dependent on the given situa
tion.

Regardless of which is the primary vehicle used,

the other media should be included to augument the primary
one.

According to Roger Ailes, former media consultant

for Richard Nixon, the media used in a campaign should be
coordinated "so that when television is running, radio and
print and whatever else y o u ’re going to do ... is running
at the same time to get maximum synergistic effect."
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Since 1960, television had become the favorite medium
72
for communicating political messages and was the primary
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medium used in Louisiana's gubernatorial campaign of 1979.
Further illustrating its virtues is the fact that television
evokes, both aural and visual attention.

"Unlike written

or audio speeches, TV provides a concrete image of the
speaker.

Facial expressions and bodily gestures as well
73
as verbal intonation punctuate a message."
It affords
the political candidate a different more dramatic way to
communicate with his electorate and, although it is an
expensive and technical medium, its usage "endows the can74
didate with an aura of importance."
"While

television pictures lack any capacity to en

lighten voters about the candidate's policy positions,
they certainly contribute to the development of people's
75
images of the candidate " ‘ Keating and Latane supported
this

contention by citing the 1960.Presidential debate.

Although the Kennedy-Nixon debates failed to alter the
attitudes of the electorate toward the debate issue, the
76
image of the candidates was changed by the debates.
Research indicates that a variety of viewers tend to
see the same personal image of a televised candidate, but
77
that the influence of the candidate's image may vary. The
most common effect of a candidate's image on the viewing
78
electorate is crystallization, rather than conversion.
For example, the public's belief that Kennedy's image was
superior to Nixon's aroused more voters, already inclined
toward a Democrat candidate, to work for and vote for
Kennedy.

Crystallizations indicate the electorate will
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vote for the candidate of the party to which they were
79
habitually inclined.
In past elections the use of issues in campaigns "have
been either ignored or underplayed because the don't lend
themselves to television advertising or journalism."
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The emphasis has been on candidates persuading the elector
ate by focusing on their personal image.

Since the 1960's,

the electorate has been persuaded more by a candidate's
projected image than by the candidate's stance on political
issues.

Frequently, though, the candidate does use issues
81
to enhance his image.
Some research indicates that the
electorate has difficulty recalling campaign issues. Ap
proximately 25% of the electorate could not recall any
82
issue during a senatorial campaign in 1972.
In political advertisements, words often seem less
important than pictures.

The effectiveness of the ad

vertisement "can come from the dramatic whole, from the
rapid sequence of still pictures, each a frozen movement
itself, slipping by so fast as to leave a mere impression
83
of a greater-than-life character."
Another of televxsion's
strong points is the fact that TV sets are found in ap84
proximately 98% of American households.
"We are now a
visual world.

The majority of the population has lost its

ability to visualize ... TV is a substitute for the non85
thinking person."
Television, however, is not a flawless political aid.
There are limitations to its ability to project effective-
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ly a candidate’s image.

Hofstetler contends that politi

cal ads can reinforce or strengthen a pre-existing image,
issue positions, and candidate perceptions.

"Any changes

in viewer imagery of perception ... might be mostly in de
gree or intensity, but not in direction.

Television,

then, would not seem to be as great a tool for viewer man86

ipulation as might be expect."
Even though television is a highly influential mass
communication channel, "no sensible candidate places ex87
elusive reliance on it."
Campaign experts generally ad
vise the usage of all available media.

Various other ad

vertising devices should be considered - billboards, radio,
television, newspapers, letter writing, telephone committee
programs, handbills.

The cartridges "must be fired be

cause, among the multitude of blanks, one may be a bullet."
We might say that candidates are marketed, similar to the
way a company markets its products.
Joe McGinnis, in his book. The Selling of the Presi
dent, explained the serious problem he and Richard Nixon’s
staff encountered during the 1968 presidential campaign
in the effort to present Nixon to the voting public.
Now you put him on television, you've got a prob
lem right away. H e 's a funny-looking guy. He
looks like somebody hung him in a closet over
night and he jumps out in the morning with his
suit all bunched up and starts running around'say
ing, 'I want to be president." I mean this is how
he strikes some people. That’s why these shows
(his advertisements! are important. To make them
forget all of that. ^
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To enhance Nixon's image, McGinnis' advertising staff
took control of all aspects of his presentation to the
public.

The staff members insisted on creating a proper,

controlled environment for their candidate.

For example,

a televised panel discussion featuring Nixon was planned to
project him as knowledgeable and well-respected, personal
qualities lacking in Nixon's unsuccessful presidential
campaign of 1960.

In preparing the show, such factors as

proper color, designs, sounds, and lighting were selected.
In this endeavor they went so far as to have Johnny Carson's
make-up man prepare Nixon for the cameras.

The carefully

chosen panel for the discussion included one Negro (two
would have looked too obvious), a Jewish lawyer, the
president of a local Polish-Hungarian group, a housewife,
a businessman, a representative of a middle-class group,
and two newsmen.

The panel members were briefed as to
90
which questions they were to ask.
The audience attending the panel discussion, also
carefully chosen, included 300 citizens, black and white,
from a local Republican organization. Since no reporters
were allowed in the audience, the planned production went
unnoticed.

Following certain remarks made by Nixon, an

applause sign would appear and the crowd would cheer.

At

the close of the show, the audience was instructed to
"mob Nixon," thus creating the impression that Nixon was

enthusiastically received.
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This elaborate show, and other techniques used by
the advertising staff, were successful in "selling" their
candidate, in convincing the public that Nixon was the
best man for the office of president.
Other devices employed to aid in communicating the
political message to the, voters were used in Jimmy Carter1s
1976 presidential campaign.

The media consultant, Jerry

Rafshoon, focused on five-minute commercials (which pre
viously had never been attempted).

The purpose of the

commercials was to insure that Carter would have more to
92
say on the issues than any of his opponents. The format
of the commercials was substantially: Carter would touch
on five or six questions, devoting 40-50 seconds to each,
rather than dwelling on any single issue.

This technique

was designed better to hold audience attention.

Accord

ing to Carter's campaign manager, Hamilton Jordon, "Can
didates don't create issues.
of the voters.

Issues exist in the minds
93
Candidates respond."

Another technique employed by the Carter team was
the use of two-minute ads, considered more effective than
five-minute ones.

Rafshoon then decided to mix the two

and five-minute ads.

This combination proved to be an ef

fective strategy, for later in the campaign viewers often
thought the commercials were network news programs, instead of political advertisements.

94

David Garth, political consultant from New York, has
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employed many unique and successful techniques in his po95
litical advertisements. An example was evident in his
handling of John Lindsay's 1965 New York mayoral campaign.
Garth had the attractive, but unpopular Lindsay campaign
"through the streets of New York, coat over his shoulder,
shirt sleeves rolled up, tie askew, the picture of youth
and vigor in a city bored and disenchanted with the pre96
dictable plodding ways of 'Bumbling Bob' Wagner."
This
type of campaigning was an effective element in Garth's
image-making process.
Dan Walker's gubernatorial campaign is another ex
ample of the success of Garth's technique.

Walker had

been the "quintessence of a slicked-down, limousine-riding
97
business executive," until he hired Garth, who drastical
ly changed that image.

His hair grew longer, the fancy

suits came off, replaced by blue jeans, flannel shirts
and a red bandana.

Walker was elected.

Garth's ads are usually simple, direct and honest.
His commercials come across not as overly impressive, but
are effective.

His advertising uses printed key words at
93
the bottom of the TV screen, "to amplify and expand." In

his commercials there is considerable information that the
viewer cannot take in all at one viewing. "Our commercials
are designed for the long haul," he says. "We know that
people are going to be seeing them ten to twelve times
during a campaign and we want to keep them interested.

We

want to leave them with a bit of a message everytime they
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see it, so that by the end of the campaign they, will have
99
taken in a lot of facts backing up one impression.”
Gene Wyckoff suggests that TV commercials should be
moving - a visual continuity, reaction shots, and pictorial
100
flowing from one sequence to another. He notes that a
common mistake in political ads is to dwell too much on
the candidate, that more shots should be shown, for ex
ample, of concerned people listening.

Another mistake is

that campaign films often talk too much.
vertiser should "let the drama speak."

Rather, the ad-
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Wyckoff favors the use of such techniques as "cutting
to music," and "ancestral motivation."

The first term

emphasizes the importance of proper-music in advertising.
It provides a muscial buildup to "catch the audience in
the mounting excitement.”

For this technique to be suc

cessful, he says the music must flow in a proper rhythmic montage.

102

As ancestral motivation Wyckoff uses certain elements
103
of personality in campaign tactics. The family tradition
theme has been successfully used by many politicians who
have an ancestry of political figures.

It employs emotion

al appeal in presenting the candidate's message.
Another suggestion of Wyckoff is that dramatic com
mercials make the candidate remembered: "frequently words
104
can be less important than pictures."
The effect, there
fore, can come from the dramatic whole: "from the rapid
sequence of still pictures, each a frozen moment in itself,
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slipping by so fast as to leave mere impressions of a
greater-than-life character." 105
Other production techniques that may increase or
heighten the illusion that the political campaign is a
drama are the reaction shot and the rigid time-period
factor.

The reaction shot shows a candidate surrounded

by applauding and cheering people as he finishes a speech
or appears at a political function, seeking to give the
impression that the candidate has positive effect on his
106
audience.
The rigid time-period fact device, employed when the
advertiser has only a few seconds of minutes to communi
cate the message, calls for the commercial to be concise
and the impression is based not on substance, but rather on
*. i
107
style.

Another method to create the proper image is panel
discussions carried on by several intellectual or well108
known people who interview the candidate.
The intent
of this format is to create the illusion of endorsements
by well-known citizens,

The members on the panel ask

prepared questions which allow the candidate to state
his views on the particular issue.

In these panels, the

entire format must be completely rehearsed to avoid the
embarrassment of the participants being caught off guard.
The filmed documentaries plan is an entertaining
format for making political appeals, a technique similar
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to those used in show business.

109

A symbolic scene repre

senting the film's basic theme is devised, and repeated
at appropriate times, to convey to the audience the de
sired image.

The strategy here is "don't reveal too much

about the candidate; give the impression that he can con
trol situations without actually showing him doing so.
Keep the candidate off the screen by using his voice with
110
his picture, but not the candidate himself."
In this,
by maximizing the visual effects, the pictures can speak
for themselves; the spoken is adapted to the visual, rather
than the reverse.

The same phrases are not used repeatedly.

In personal appearances the politician must be redundant
\ to give attention, but this is not true of film.

1H

Finally, Wyckoff's studies show that television
viewers learn more from hearing the audio and watching an
unrelated video than from having the speaker give them
112
the message via audio and video together.
According to Dan Nimmo, it is all-important in TV
advertising to select spots where there is the heaviest
viewing audience and an audience composed of the elector113
ate composition the candidate wants to address.
Advertis
ers feel that personalities not issues or political parties,
win votes.

Therefore, the advertisers plan should be to

"continue spontaneity, and make the effort to appear un
inhibited, candid, open, and credible, without an unre114
hearsed performance."
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The advisors exploit the best features of the candidate in order to form his political personality - how he
performs on the medium, his political role, and his po
litical qualities.

The political role of the candidate

refers to the impression he gives of his ability as a
politician - his astuteness, grasp of issues, knowledge,
and ability to control any situation.

Depiction of his

personal qualities should show him to be sympathetic able to share the feelings and emotions of his audience.
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His personality should relate to "the attention - getting
116
image of ourselves, our image of our behavior.
Cam
paign advisors should intermingle all these aspects of per
sonality.

This, as all phases of a successful campaign,

requires a team of advertising experts with a sound pro
gram, a media plan which is a strategic blueprint, listing
117
the campaign's assumptions and the objectives.
Included in the media plan are the personality traits
that need to be stressed, the issues that may arise, and
the basic image that should be created.

Also, the plan

must be designed with the mood of the state, parish, or
nation in mind.

The plan also outlines the form the

advertisements should take and the way it should be mar118
keted, targeted, and phased.
The assumptions of the plan relate to the environment,
the candidates' position at the beginning of the campaign,
and the objectives indicate where the candidate would like
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to be at the end of the campaign; the object is to get the
candidate to that position.
Campaign appeals are usually made to specific groups,
but there should be concern about a
tion.

backlash of opposi

Democrats ordinarily attempt to hold together their

electoral coalition, while Republicans try to increase
their base of support by denying the accusation that they
119
are the party of the rich and big business.
Frequently, the plan of the campaign is to destroy the
image of the opposition.

Instead of playing to their can

didate's strength, they attack the opposition's weakness.
This strategy was seen in 1964, when the Democrats attacked
Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater on his
stand on nuclear weapons with an advertisement showing a
girl picking a daisy, while a time clock ticked away toward
120
a nuclear blast.
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CHAPTER III
AN OVERVIEW OP THE CAMPAIGN
Six major candidates sought to succeed Edwin Edwards,
the outgoing, two-term Democratic governor, in the 1979
Louisiana gubernatorial campaign.

All six were complet

ing terms as elected public officials.
THE CANDIDATES
James E. Fitzmorris, of New Orleans; completing his
eighth year as Lieutenant-Governor.

He also served as

Chairman of the state board of Commerce and Industry.
Paul J. Hardy, St. Martinville; elected to the State
Senate in 1972 and, in 1976, elected Secretary of State.
E.

L. "Bubba" Henry (only north Louisianian in the

race); elected Speaker of the House in 1972, a position
he held during the campaign.
Louis J. Lambert of Gonzales; elected to the State
Senate in 1972 and in 1974 elected to the State Public
Service Commission.
Edgar "Sonny" Mouton of Lafayette; member of the House
of Representatives 1964-66; a State Senator from 1966-1979,
and President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
David Treen, also from New Orleans, was the only Repub
lican in the campaign.

He was elected to the U. S. House of
42

43

Representatives in 1972.
candidate for governor.

In 1975, Treen was an unsuccessful
He was re-elected to Congress in

1978 and served in that capacity during the campaign.
THE MEDIA CONSULTANTS
Since 1964, the choice of the media manager of a
campaign has been critical to the candidacy of the individ
ual.

The choice has ranked with that of campaign manager

and chief fund raiser as a first imperative of candidacy.
The media man must be artist and businessman all at once.
He must be able to shoot film, to edit the film, to buy
the time slots, and to locate network audiences he hopes
^
1
to reach.

The enormous amount of money each candidate had
collected for the campaign enabled all to employ top talent
in media consultants, "the men who decide how to present
2
the candidate to the voters."
The consultants enlisted,
prominent both nationally and locally, presented Louisiana's
television-viewing voters with political TV which matched
in quality that of a presidential campaign.
Rusty Cantelli and Tom Varisco, from New Orleans, pro
duced the television commercials for Lt. Governor Jimmy
Fitzmorris.

Relatively new media consultants, their larg

est account up to that time had been State Senator Nat
Keifer's unsuccessful bid in 1978 for mayor of New Orleans.
Raymond Strother and Gus Weill, of Baton Rouge, managed
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the media portion of Paul Hardy's campaign.

Strother and

Weill had been associated with Louisiana politics for more
than twenty years and had managed numerous campaigns, in
cluding Edwin Edwards' successful re-election in 1975 and
several other statewide campaigns in 1979.
Bubba Henry hired Charles Guggenheim of Washington,
D. C. His "reputation as a media consultant is formidable.
He has produced television for two presidential, and more
3
than sixty gubernatorial campaigns."
His productions
have won two Academy Awards for documentary films.

He

also managed Senator Edward Kennedy's 1980 presidential
campaign.
Three different consultants managed Louis Lambert's
media campaign.

Jim Carvin, of New Orleans, the first

Lambert hired, had been involved in Louisiana politics
for more than thirty years.

He had managed more than

fifty campaigns in the state, including Edwin Edward's
successful 1971 gubernatorial race; the 1978 campaign of
Ernest Morial, New Orlean's first black mayor; and Gillis
Long's unsuccessful bid for governor in 1965.

Carvin was

later replaced with Robert Squires of Washington, D. D.,
another nationally-prominent media consultant.

Squires

was later replaced by Strother and Weill.
Sonny Mounton began his campaign with David Garth of
New York, "the heavyweight champion of political consul4
tants."
Garth's political victories have included his
handling of Hugh Carey's Gubernatorial campaign, Mayor
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Edward Koch's successful quests for mayor of New York, and
the election of Los Angeles1 Tom Bradley, the first black
mayor of a major city.

Garth's political record lists 71

victories and only 16 defeats.

These victories include-

elections of state candidates, gubernatorial candidates, and
U. S. senators and representatives.

Midway through the cam

paign, however, Mouton became dissatisfied with his campaign
and replaced Garth with Charles Roemer of Bossier City,
Louisiana, Governor Edwin Edwards' commissioner of adminisstration.

Roemer served Mouton as media consultant until

the end of the campaign.
Dave Treen employed Ronald Facheaux and Jim Farwell,
the two youngest media men in the campaign.

With the ex

ception of Governor Edwards' 1971 campaign, this campaign
was the first major media-consulting experience for Faucheaux
and Farwell.

They received assistance from professional

Republican media consultants from Houston and Los Angeles.
CAMPAIGN EXPENSES
In Louisiana voters were exposed to the most expensive
gubernatorial campaign in the state's history.

The guber

natorial candidates spent $13.4 million through the re
porting period that ended fifteen days before the primary
election.

Of this amount, approximately $8 million went

. .
5
for advertising.
Other campaign costs included public opinion polls,
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fees paid to political organizations, telephone banks,
direct mailings, signs and posters, and paid staff mem
bers .
Television advertising is expensive and costs approx
imately $4000. for producing a 60 second advertisement.

If

the media consultant elects to hire a film crew and produce
a 60-second commercial, "on location," the cost can increase
6
to upward of $30,000 per advertisement.
Added to the candidate's campaign expenses is the
cost of television time.

The charge for time depends upon

the television station and its ratings.

Generally, a 60-

second "prime time" interval during the campaign ran be7
tween $500 and $1600.
Media consultants receive approximately 15 percent
in commissions for placing political advertisements.

For

example, Raymond Strother's fee for handling Paul Hardy's
campaign ranged from $2500 a month to $10,000 a month.

In

addition, Strother received 15 percent of the cost of all
g

television time.

Cantelli and Varisco's fee for the

Fitzmorris campaign was "$100,000 or 15 percent of the
9
media money spent, whichever is greater."
Lambert had raised approximately $2.85 million as of
October 12, 1979, and spent more than $2.9 million during
that time.

Most of his expenditures were for media ad

vertising, which totaled $1.6 million in payments to agen
cies alone.

He also made payments of slightly less than

$300,000 to Matt Reese and Associates, an internationally
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10
known political organizing and canvassing firm.
Lambert spent approximately $11,270 on political or
ganizations which endorsed him.

He gave money to more than

forty groups,which "are supposed to provide canvassing,
advertising, ballot distribution and other campaign and
11
election day services."
The runoff cost Lambert approximately an additional
$800,000, according to campaign finance disclosure reports.
The campaign period extended from October 28 to December 8.
He spent approximately $150,000 from his campaign funds
in a court battle defending his second-place finish in the
12
October 27 primary election.
OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN
The official results of the October 27, 1979 open
primary indicated that Democrat Louis Lambert would face
front runner Republican Dave Treen for the Louisiana gov
ernorship on December 8.

Of the 1.9 million registered

voters in the state of Louisiana, "approximately 1.4 mil
lion votes were cast for governor, or 70.5 percent of all
13
registered voters in the state."
The official vote revealed that 17,000 votes separated
the three top candidates.

Dave Treen received 297,674

votes, or 21.8 percent of the total's, Louis Lambert was
second, receiving 283,266 votes or 20.7 percent; and Jimmy
Fitzmorris was third, with 280,760 votes, or 20.6 percent.
The other major candidates were Paul Hardy with 227,026
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votes (16.6%); E. L. "Bubba" Henry with 135,769 (9.9%);
and Sonny Mouton with 124,333 (9.1%).

The unofficial re

sults of the open primary election were contested by Fitzmorris who originally finished second in the unofficial
count.
second.

However, the later official total placed Lambert
After several days of court proceedings, Fitz-

morris's suit was dismissed and

Lambert was declared the

second place finisher.
Lambert's highest support came primarily from a large
block of parishes, consisting of the Florida parishes.
and those bordering the Mississippi River, from Point
Coupee to St. John.

Lambert's lowest support came from the

Acadia and Lafayette parishes and' the northwest area of
the state. He finished first in two standard metropolitan
statistical areas - Baton Rouge (40.9%) and Lake Charles
(23%), and second in Alexandria with 20.4% of the vote.

The

official statistics showed Lambert receiving the most black
14
support of the campaign, with 40% of the total black vote.
In the December 8 general election, Republican Treen
defeated Democrat Lambert to become Louisiana's first Re
publican governor since the Reconstruction era.

Treen re

ceived 50.3% or 690,691 votes to Lambert's 49.7% or 681,134
votes.

Although Lambert carried 42 parishes compared with

Treen's 22 parishes, the voter participation in the parish
es carried by Treen provided the necessary margin of victory.
Lambert received his largest support in Allen, Red River,
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Jackson, and the Florida parishes.

Lambert captured 5 0.3%
15
of the urban vote compared with Treen's 53.1%.
Although
Lambert again received solid black support, approximately
90% of the black vote, it was not enough to overcome Treen's
majority.
LOUIS LAMBERT - THE MAN
Louis Lambert, born in DeRidder, Louisiana, December
21, 194 0, grew up in Sorrento, Louisiana in Ascension Parish.
He has been a resident of Gonzales, Louisiana since 1966.
He attended the public school system in Ascension Parish,
studied at Southeastern Louisiana University, and re
ceived his B.A. from Louisiana State University in Baton
Rouge.

After earning his law degree from Loyola Univers

ity in New Orleans, Lambert practiced law in Gonzales and
later served as that municipality's city attorney. He is
married to the former Mary Gayle Smith of Gonzales.
16
are the parents of three children.

They

Lambert was first elected to public office in 1971 as
a state senator from District 18, which encompasses As
cension, St. James, and Livingston parishes.

As a senator,

he served in the Finance, Transportation and Highways agen
cies and

Local and Municipal Affairs Committees.

In No

vember, 1972, he was elected a delegate to the Constitution
al Convention, during which he was named chairman of the
Committee on Natural Resources and Environment.
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In 1974, Lambert was elected to the Public Service
Commission from a district comprising over one-third of
the state - parts of Southeast Louisiana and most of South
west Louisiana, from Calcasieu, Beauregard, and Cameron
on the west, to East and West Feliciana, Tangipahoa, and
Livingston on the east, and East Baton Rouge on the North.
When the Public Service Commission was expanded from three
to five members, Lambert's district was reduced to the
Flordia parishes, the Baton Rouge area, and various river
parishes.

Following his election to the Public Service
17
Commission, he was selected that commision's chairman.
Lambert had hoped to use his membership on the Public
Service Commission as a springboard to the governor's

office, the strategy successfully employed by three past
Louisiana governors, Huey P. Long, Jimmie H. Davis, and
John J. McKeithen, all of whom were members of that agency
during their gubernatorial campaigns.

"That route to the

mansion has required a bit of populist approach.

Long

certainly had the common touch,. Davis was everybody’s
favorite country singer, and McKeithen became identified
18
with the nickel phone call."
Lambert had hoped to follow
the populist tradition by campaigning to "make fuel more
available to Louisianians at cheaper prices, hold down
utility costs, make the nuclear plants shape up and fight
19
OPEC to the last drop."
Lambert gained statewide political attention by con
fronting the big utility companies on a variety of issues.
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In the Senate, in the Constitutional convention, and as
Public Service Commission Chairman, he had attacked the
utility companies. In his announcement for governor, he
made his positions clear.

He was against nuclear power?

he favored doing away with industrial tax exemptions; he
wanted to bar utilities from charging consumers in advance
for the cost of power plant construction, and he opposed
permitting the phone companies to charge subscribers for
directory assistance calls.
Lambert planned to follow his past political campaign
philosophy for sharing his political ideas with the public.
111 will take my case directly and forthrightly to the
people who, I believe, have always seen in me a true friend,
and a man who has always stood by their interests: I am
confident of their sound reason and their strong desires
to elect a man who can improve the lot of all the people
of this state, a man who has never been captured by special
20
interests or forgotten from where he came."
THE ISSUES
Finding the most compelling issues in any political
campaign is no easy matter.

Different candidates stress

different issues. Lambert's initial basic platform consist
ed of four major planks: public education quality, guberna
torial appointments, taxation and finance, and labor-manage21
ment relations.
"I find no businessman, no mother, no father, who does
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not agree with me that Louisiana1s number one problem is
22

the poverty of its educational system.

One of his

public education plans was to strengthen screening devices
(such as teacher placement tests) to insure teacher com
petency.

He also urged schools to participate in insuring

classroom competence by hiring above average new teachers,
improving education policies, awarding less tenure, im
plementing in-service programs for faculty, and encourag
ing teachers to work together to perfect skills.

Finally,

Lambert proposed that the allocation of state education
dollars be made on a program basis, rather than a pupil-todollar basis.
Lambert's plan for improvement of gubernatorial ap
pointments was to employ the most competent and independent
people.

His proposal called for the use of a task force

to advise in the selection of appointments.

"The general

criteria I will adopt are an emphasis on minorities, women
and young people, as well as ordinary citizens who possess
various

talents, but have never been asked to serve in
23
government."
A third area of interest to Lambert was taxation and
finance.

He announced his intentions of controlling

spending and establishing priorities so that more and high
er taxes are not required.

On the issue of state aid to

local government, he argued that state support of local
government "must be based on the long run development of
24
the region and the state - not on charity."
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The topic of labor management relations was of con
cern to all candidates in the race, primarily due to the
controversial Right-to-Work Law, which was strongly sup
ported by business groups, but bitterly opposed by labor
groups.

Lambert's official comment on this issue was:

"I feel that the Right-to-Work Law has not been in effect
long enough to determine its true economic impact.

An in

dependent study should consider the effect of the law on
employment, industrial inducement, living standards and
economic growth.112^
Although Lambert's positions at the outset of the
campaign portrayed him in the image of a populist, he was
prepared for criticism: "In each of my elections I have been
opposed by large and special interests.

I am not their
26

captive and will never be... in the forthcoming election."
LAMBERT'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
According to longtime Louisiana political observer
Edmund Reggie, organization is a key ingredient in a po
litical campaign.

"Our (Louisiana) political organization

is so much better, so much more in detail than other
states.

We organize campaigns in this state, statewide,

and that is over 2,000 precincts.
27
the precinct level."

We organize them down to

A campaign organization is a group of people whose
coordinated efforts are aimed at helping elect the candi
date they support.

The groups consists of supporters who
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have assumed leadership roles, volunteers who have agreed
to work in the campaign, and all voters who have been iden
tified as supporting the candidate.

The strength of an

organization depends on the number of people involved, their
dedication to the candidate, and how well they are moti28
vated and organized.
Lambert's state headquarters was located in Baton Rouge,
and it was at this location that his organization staff
was housed.

This staff, responsible for proper and con

tinuous commications at all levels of the campaign, con
sisted of the campaign director, political director, field
director, communications director, finance chairman, vol
unteer director, dialogue chairman, leadership survey di
rector, Go-Day director, scheduling director, labor liaison,
29
minority liaison, and headquarters manager.
The "Campaign Political Committee" geographically
organized the state by using committees.
consisted of two regional directors.

The committee

One of them organ

ized the North staff, consisting of a Northwest and North
east manager; the other organized the South staff, employ
ing the Southwest, Acadia, and South Central managers and
managers for the Florida and River parishes, as well as
30
Jefferson and Orleans Parish.
There were also two regional field floaters.

These

individuals were in the field making personal contact with
district and parish coordinators.

Their duties consisted

of resolving difficulties that arose among fieldworkers,
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giving state headquarters another perspective on activi
ties in the field, and monitoring the progress of projects
originating at headquarters.

The Floaters reported to

their respective regional coordinators for direction.
When completed, Lambert's organization was ready to
assume responsibility for strategic planning, decision
making, information gathering and the vital communicating
necessary in the course of political campaigns.

He was

ready to begin.
THE BEGINNING STRATEGY
Jim Garvin's first poll for Lambert was taken by
Bowles and Groves of Dallas, Texas in early 1978.

The

purpose of the poll was to determine Lambert's name recog
nition throughout the state.

The results revealed that he

had a low name recognition outside his Public Service dis
trict.

Although not desirable, at the outset of a campaign

this is not necessarily harmful to the individual's candi
dacy.

Both John J. McKeithen and Edwin Edwards, for example,

had low name recognition before they began campaigning for
governor.31
But Lambert's low name recognition prompted Garvin
and other advisors to make an early official announce
ment.

They planned an elaborate public announcement, to be

unfolded during a three day period.

The first announcement

came during a press conference in New Orleans on the morn
ing of June 28th.

Lambert and his staff then in private
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planes flew to Baton Rouge for a noon annoucement and to
Shreveport for a cocktail party and fund-raising event
that evening.

The next morning they flew to Monroe for

a press conference, to Alexandria for a noon luncheon,
and then to Lafayette for another fund-raising meet.

On

the final day, June 30th, they held a morning press con
ference in Lake Charles; flew to Houma for another,
and completed the day with an afternoon press conference
32
in Hammond.
During the three-day announcement period, staff workers
and volunteers placed 4 x 8

signs in the Florida parishes,

in sections of north Louisiana, and along stretches of In
terstate 10 between

New Orleans and Lake Charles.

signs were dark blue, with the message, "Lambert,

The
'80

Governor," printed in white and light blue.
Garvin's next strategy was to prepare a tabloid em33
phasizing Lambert's various positive qualities. The 8-page
color tabloid positioned Lambert with students, farmers,
oil and seafood employees, his family, and Public Service
Commission members and Carvin arranged for the tabloid to
appear as a supplement to the Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate,
the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the Lafayette Advertiser,
the Lake Charles American Press, the Zachary Plainsman
News, the Sunday Iberian, the Opelousas Sunday World, the
Houma Courier, the Slidell Times, the Daily Sentry News,
the Clinton Watchman, the St. Francisville Democrat, the
Gonzales Weekly, the Greater Plaquemine Post, the Bogalusa
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Sunday Mews, and the Slidell News Banner, and in news
papers in the northern part of the state.
The main purpose for circulating the tabloid state
wide was to extend Lambert's name recognition.

Each cam

paign year, the Baton Rouge Advocate commissions a state
wide survey to estimate the strength of potential guberna
torial candidates and it was hoped that the tabloid would
34
also "influence the Advocate poll."
Carvin had placed
the tabloids in the various newspapers two weeks prior to
the 1979 poll, at a cost of approximately $100,000.
The results of the initial Advocate gubernatorial
polling showed Dave Treen and Jimmy Fitzmorris "significant
ly ahead of all other potential candidates.

Although Lam

bert was in fourth place with 6-7%, he was in front of pos
sible candidates such as Commissioner of Administration,
Charles Roemer and Attorney General William Guste.

The re

sults of the poll made Lambert a viable candidate in the
35
eyes of the press and the public."
During the opening stages of the campaign, Carvin or
ganized the distribution throughout the state of bumper
stickers, 4 x 8

signs, billboards, buttons, and literature.

His production and circulation of these various support
materials began the public phase of Lambert's image-making.
The primary purpose of support materials is to increase
the positive name recognition of a candidate, "to have a
36
set of identifiers that people can understand,"
or "to
37
reinforce the support a candidate is already receiving."
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Carvin was careful in his choice of Lambert's campaign
colors because of the importance of colors in overall image
creation.

"The link between color and a product, consist

ently pursued, leads to subconscious identification,

[and]

is used by advertising artists with particular success in
38
the creation of an image."
The impact of the candidate's
selected color is usually made on the subconscious level
of the electorate.

Although a person may be unconscious

of the colors around him, his behavior may be powerfully
affected by these colors.

Tests have shown that colors
39
can add to the retentive power of an image.
Carvin
used a royal blue color in all Lambert's campaign support

materials because "it is not a color that turns people
off.

It's a cool color and it has a neutral effect ... al

so, Lambert had gray hair and it (his hair) worked well
40
with blue.
Media consultants frequently rely on particular colors
which may reinforce an intended image of the candidate.
they wish to project.

Jimmy Carter, for example, used the

color green in his 1976 presidential campaign.

This in

frequently used political color aided the Carter staff in
their attempts to portray Carter as a different, new poli
tician.

While campaigning as an "outsider" trying to re

store honesty and integrity to the White House, Carter's
use of the green color seemed to support his image as a
new breed of politician.
Another example of color selection in a political cam-
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paign was Paul Hardy's use of a redish-orange color in his
1979 gubernatorial campaign.

This color apparently was

used to reinforce Hardy's overall image of a flamboyant,
aggressive candidate.
In.summary, the color a candidate uses can support
the image he attempts to create.

Although colors are not

A main element in the image-making process, they have
proved helpful in aiding an establishment of an overall
image.
With the campaign strategy planned and his organization
intact, Louis Lambert's campaign for governor of Louisiana
was prepared for the long and extensive race-

A vital .

part of the campaign would be the image he would project to
Louisiana's electorate.
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CHAPTER IV
LAMBERT'S IMAGE-MAKING CAMPAIGN
PHASE I
As related, Louis Lambert's media consultant for the
beginning of his campaign, Phase I, was Jim Carvin.

Car-

vin's style in producing political commercials lays special
stress on the artistic quality of filming and on the
staging of the ads, but is active in all phases of the
campaign work.

For each advertisement, Carvin "writes the

spot, plans it, then shoots the spot so that I know that
the end product is what I started out with on a piece of
1
paper."
He also is involved in political strategy and
campaign organizing, planning the campaign "along the lines
of a svstem developed for

building

a nuclear submarine.

It's intended to ensure that everything gets done at the
right time, that everything possible is anticipated, and
2
that there's flexibility for emergencies."
Carvin's image-making strategy for Lambert's campaign
was "to position Lambert in the middle of the road, as a
populist candidate who was generally conservative ... a
conservative populist, very much in the style of Edwin
3
Edwards and John McKeithen."
Carvin planned to have
Lambert appeal to blacks and

to blue-collar voters by

meeting them in face-to-face settings.

His rationale .

for this strategy was that many blacks and blue-collar
62
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voters are more than ordinarily concerned with such problems
as family income and health care.

Only during the last

couple of weeks of the campaign do they become firmly decided for which candidate they will vote.

4

By appealing to

these groups in an interpersonal manner, rather than through
media, Carvin was able "to position Lambert in the middle
5
of the road." In campaigning face-to-face with black and
blue-collar voters, Lambert appeared as a populist candi
date while projecting a conservative image when campaigning
on television.

Since the face-to-face gatherings reached

small audiences, his attempts to remain a conservative can
didate to his larger television audience was better insured.
Carvin1s media strategy for projecting Lambert as a
conservative populist began with his first television ads.
These initial 30—second biographical ads were aired state
wide, and "said things about Lambert that he couldn't say
6
about himself. " They showed him walking along a road in
Sorento, Louisiana, talking about his plans for the state. A
second biographical ad produced identified Lambert with a
city (Baton Rouge), because "we wanted also to give him an
urban image, not just a country guy who was running for
7
governor."
In these, and the remainder of the ads Carvin produced,
he used a Steadi-Cam, a sophisticated camera capable of
filming constant movement without disrupting the quality of
the film.

The Steadi-Cam "involved Lambert in the spot,
8
while adding action to the production."
The constant move-

64
i

ment of the camera showed him "as a man with vitality, vig9
or, and activity." Carvin's decision to have Lambert walk
ing toward the camera began as an experiment, but the tech10
nique "looked like a good gimmick so we made it ours."
Aged thirty-eight, Lambert was the second youngest can
didate in the race and his election would have made him the
youngest governor in the history of the state. Carvin recog
nized this as a potentially negative characteristic and count
ered by portraying Lambert as an experienced middle-aged
candidate.

Lambert's conservative wardrobe and silver hair

aided Carvin in this effort.
Following the introductory biographical ads, Carvin pro
duced a new set of commercials. The image of Lambert in this
series was derived from the information received in a poll
taken by Bowles- and Groves, which revealed that "the people
were vitally interested in energy, inflation, and utility
11
rates."
This information impelled Carvin to portray Lam
bert as "a champion of the consumer and a fighter of higher
12
costs."
Lambert's physical appearance was also altered for the
new series of commercials. He was persuaded to dress in an
attractive two-piece suit, which "made him look like a gov13
ernor."
This attire seemed to enhance his perceived abil
ity to communicate and to appear to discuss the various
topics he addressed with authority.
In attempting to communicate to the electorate Lambert's
concern for a "cancerous" inflation rate, fueled by rising--
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■utility and energy costs Carvin's ads "attracted attention
14
for Lambert, and then controversy."
These spots showed
him on Wall Street in New York addressing the issue of the
high cost of living; at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania,
explaining the dangers of nuclear plants; and in Geneva,
Switzerland, criticizing the OPEC nations for the high
price of energy.
Carvin was criticized for these three out-of-state ads,
primarily because of Lambert's refusal directly to address
the issues in Louisiana.

Also, the public felt that Lambert

was wasteful in traveling far distances to address issues
facing Louisianians. Carvin defended the ads by explaining
the circumstances that led to his decision to produce them.
In March, 1979, prior to the ads’ appearance, Carvin com
missioned Bowles and Grove to administer a poll of the pub
lic's opinion of various issues and of Lambert's position in
the polls compared with that of the other candidates. Results
of the poll showed Lambert in 4th place, with 12% of the vote;
Hardy 3rd, with 19%, Fitzmorris with 27%, and Treen, 32%.
The poll also revealed that Lambert's image in the Baton
Rouge area was highly positive, because of his continual
challenges of the utility companies while chairman of the
Public Service Commission. Therefore, Carvin decided that
Lambert's stand against the utility companies was the image
15
to be projected to the electorate statewide.
During this period, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate
ran a series of articles attacking the Public Service Com
mission.

One article, quoting a source from Wall Street,
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claimed that Lambert was not properly representing the con
sumers of Louisiana.

Lambert's reaction to this article -

informing the electorate that wealthy Wall Street executives
were against him - fitted the classic populist image that
the working class hates Wall Street.

Carvin felt that the

most effective commercial for refuting this negative public
ity was to film the ad at Wall Street.
While preparing to shoot the Wall Street ad, the Three
Mile Island nuclear mishap occurred. Lambert went before a
Legislative committee as chairman of the Public Service Com
mission and declared he would go to Three Mile Island. When
he announced this plan, Carvin decided to capitalize on
this, too and two spots were shot on this subject. These
spots inspired Carvin1s idea to stage the ads in a manner
similiar to a newsman on locating covering a story.
The third controversial ad, the Geneva spot, moving
some to think Lambert a financially wasteful and flamboyant
candidate, was planned because Lambert feared his opponents
would attack him on the rising cost of utility rates. The
ad was intended to show that utility rates were not being
increased by the Public Service Commission, but were the re
sult of the fuel adjustment clause. Carvin used the approach
»

that the Arabs were responsible for this increase. In June
1979, OPEC met in Geneva and Carvin decided to film the ad
from that location. His strategy was to employ an "affirma16
tive defense ... blame others for our problems.
Carvin defended his decision for the Geneva spot by
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claiming the ad "was effective ... a bold and daring thing
17
to go outside the country."
It appeared, though, that
the commercial "gave people more to talk about than just
the issue."
But the production of the three out-of-state adver
tisements did seem to have damaged Lambert's image.

"He

began to look too showy, he began to show a lack of substance to the point of using props more than intellect."

19

A general assumption of communication theorists is
that non-verbal communications have meaning within their
specific context.

While some non-verbal communications

are used as a means of self-expression, others have per
suasion as their intent.

The various commercials produced

throughout Lambert's entire campaign transmitted important
20
non-verbal messages to the viewing audience.
Harvard psychologist Robert Rosenthal developed a
measure of sensitivity to non-verbal communication.

His

research made 200 segments showing an actress portraying
various emotions in certain contexts.

People were so ac

curate in recognizing the scene and emotion portrayed that
the experiments cut the exposure length to see at what
point accuracy diminishes.

Even at an exposure of 1/24

of a second, people were correct over two-thirds of the
21
time.
These findings confirmed Edward Sapir's observa
tion in 1927 that "we respond to gestures with an extreme
alertness and, one might say, in accordance with an elab
orate and secret.code that is written nowhere, known by

none, and understood by all."
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The major criticism of the Carvin spots was the
positioning of Lambert in locations outside of Louisiana.
When the viewers saw him speaking from Wall Street, from
Three Mile Island, and from Geneva, it appeared that their
negative perception of Lambert was the result of where he
was, rather than what he was saying.

The denotation of

the message was that Lambert was a worldly, sophisticated
man who was knowledgeable enough to deal with large prob
lems.

However, the connotation of the message was signif

icantly different than the denotation.

The electorate's

connotation of these three sites was one of elaborate un
necessary expense and an insensitivity to the concerns of
occurences in Louisiana.

Consequently, the non-verbal

aspect of the message was overpoweringly negative.
Following this series of ads, Lambert dropped further
in the polls.

Carvin produced a new series, but they were

not effective enough to erase from the public's minds the
negative image of Lambert resulting from the others.
PHASE II
As a result of his decline in the polls following the
Carvin spots, Lambert's supporters demanded a change in
political consultants.

His fourth place ranking had “chief

supporters screaming that Lambert was slipping and some
thing had to be done ... and the person out front is the
23
one who creates and he's the one to go quickly."
There-
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fore, Carvin was fired as media consultant on September 2,
1979, and replaced by Robert Squier and Associates, of
Washington, D. C.
Lambert's campaign strategist re-examined the situa
tion which found Lambert in the open primary against the
conservative, Dave Treen, and recognized the difficulty
of his running against such an arch-conservative Republican.
The results of a Bowles and Grove poll indicated that Lam
bert must be more successful if his image were changed from
a conservative to a populist candidate, an image typical of
the traditional Louisiana Democrat politician.

This re-

i

evaluation resulted in Lambert strategists altering their
24
candidate's image midway through the campaign.
Squier had been recommended to Lambert by Louisiana
Congressman Gillis Long, a Lambert supporter, who cited
the results of the 1979 Kentucky gubernatorial campaign
that Squier had recently completed.

Squier's candidate

in that race was John Y. Brown, a politically inexperienced,
multimillionaire businessman, who announced his candidacy
nine weeks before the Democratic primary.
While conducting the Brown campaign, Squier used tele
vision to communicate his message.
issues and concentrated on image."

"His TV spots sidestepped
25

For example, a widely

used two-minute commercial showed Brown and his new wife
(celebrity Phyllis George) in a coal mine, wearing head
lamps.

"To make clear the new Mrs. Brown was no femme

fatale (just a down-home cheerleader from Texas), a five-
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minute spot included twenty-two silent seconds of Phyllis
26
signing autographs.
This type of political advertising
by Squier was followed by Brown's primary victory and event
ual gubernatorial triumph.

The account of Brown's victory

persuaded Lambert to hire Squier.
Squier's philosophy of political media was the con
verse of Carvin's.

Rather than focusing on artistic di

mension, Squier placed emphasis on communicating his in
tended message to the targeted audience without stressing
the artistic dimension.

His political spots reflected the

findings of the public opinion polls.
In organizing his campaign staff, Squier employed two
prominent political campaigners from Washington, D. C.,
pollster William Hamilton and organizational specialist
Matt Reese.

Squier's aim was to exploit all available

resources that enable a candidate to win votes.
Before analyzing the image Squier created for Lambert,
it is necessary first to examine the sophisticated tech
niques Matt Reese used in targeting Lambert's constituency.
The targeting system he employed was called "Claritas," a
precise technique for pinpointing supporters and opponents
of issues or candidates ... of categorizing citizens by
‘27
neighborhood groupings, called clusters."
Claritas is
used to discover the commonalities of certain neighborhoods
as to social class or affluence, race, and ethnicity, age
and family composition, urbanization and housing style,
and other lifestyle indicators at a small population level.
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This process results in the identification of forty clusters
which represent most types of American neighborhoods.

For

example. Cluster 24 is defined as "young consumers, welleducated, largely white, reasonable affluent and fairly
28
well distributed across the nation."
The Claritas sys
tem enabled Reese to locate approximately 28 0 households
called block groups, and assign each a cluster designation.
"A politician then can target his appeal ... or political
29
message to his audience."
Maintaining proper commucation between Hamilton and
Reese was a key factor for the success of the Claritas
system.

Hamilton's responsibility was to survey a sample

group of voters in the state and inform Reese what types
of people - rich, young, or religious, for instance - think
of a specific issue or candidate.

This allows Reese to

tailor his campaign strategy to appeal to his target groups.
According to Reese, "Polls by themselves are valuable
31
but inadequate."
For example, a poll may reveal that
working-class Catholics do not favorably view a particular
candidate.

But Claritas is able to specify block groups

which are most likely to contain working-class Catholic
women, and then further specify which of those workingclass women favor and which oppose a particular candidate.
An example of the actual operation of Claritas was seen
in Missouri in 1978 when Reese was hired to defeat the
right-to-work amendment. Hamilton's poll revealed that 69
percent of the voters were in favor of right-to-work, while
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30 percent were opposed.

"Even among labor union families
32
the measure was favored 57 to 35 percent."
Reese's strategy was to spend only 15% of the 2.5 mil
lion dollar campaign budget on media.

Reese's reasoning

behind this strategy was that commercials could arouse the
opposition and attract opponents who normally would not
vote.

He, therefore, "concentrated on registering citizens

likely to vote his way."
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In addition, post-cards, tele

phone calls, and personal visits inundated households iden
tified by Claritas as the exact target audience.

The result

of this "quiet, directed attack worked -' 60 percent of those
who voted rejected the amendment."

Reese estimates that

"110,000 new voters who registered in Missouri that season
34
registered because of labor's efforts."
Reese used targeting to determine which key parishes
contained the highest concentration of Lambert "persuadables"
and would accordingly deserve extra effort.

Two hundred

thousand "persuadable" households throughout the state
were targeted for special telephone, mail and personal
contact programs.
Claritas was employed by Reese to identify Lambert's
constituencies which would be targeted - blacks and labor.
This research indicated that attention should be concen
trated on "all laborers and blacks, rural and country
35
whites."
Upon completion of the research, the entire
target area was isolated.

"So, all Squier had to do was

plug in that feeling into his TV and not worry about a cer
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tain part of society."

The research indicated that media

should concentrate on those areas where people most likely
to vote for Lambert were located.

Those areas identified

as "upper middle class, conservatives were left alone
because they would never go for us (Lambert) regardless of
what we had ... logically, we would find out ’hard'

(com

mitted) people, confirm they were for Lambert, identify
our soft vote (persuadable) and work on them hard (i.e. by
use of phone bank, mailings, voter contact programs) and
then work on the undecided, which were a large percentage
37
up until the election day, and Treen's soft vote."
Once
the necessary group had been targeted by the use of Clari
tas, Reese used telephone banks for voter identification
and recruitment.

For example, Lambert's computer person

nel pulled out phone numbers, addresses, and names of voters
registered as Democrat, people under 35 years of age, bluecollar workers, and citizens with less than two years of
college.

First, the natural constituency was determined

by this list, and then the main group on which the phone
banks would concentrate.
calls be made.

Then and only then would phone

Interviewers classified the recipient as

"neutral," "definitely against," "a worker," or "a decided
that won't work."

Next, "the workers" were set up in a

program involving direct mailing in which they were asked
to distribute campaign materials.

The success of the sys

tem depends on communication between the phone bank per
sonnel and the workers to insure that the proper work is
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being carried out.
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A major task for the Lambert telephone workers was
identifying potential Lambert voters, recruiting volunteers,
and getting the voter out on election day.

Lambert's main

phone bank, located in Baton Rouge, was manned by 14 0 call
ers,

The phone center operated seven days a week, with the

days divided into two six-hour shifts.

The phone banks

operated from the last week of September until election
day, October 28.
Hamilton's research discovered that labor and blacks
were Lambert's biggest supporters.

Therefore, Squier at

tempted to present Lambert as an appealing candidate to
his supporters by having him adapt to the particular
audiences in each commercial.

The image Carvin attempted

to create was to depict Lambert as a "fighter for the poor
39
and underprivileged.11
His technique for producing political commercials is
"cinema verite,"

(truth film), which does not require the

candidate to read or memorize a script.

Rather, the can

didate is filmed on location, talking extemporaneously in
to the camera or to

a particular group of people.

Prom

the extensive amount of footage collected, Squier then
edits the film into selected political ads "which best
40
captures issues, personalities, and images."
Once Hamilton had completed the necessary research,
his information was presented to Squier, who translated
it into commercials.

As the employment of Squier marked
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the beginning of the second phase of the Lambert campaign,
the governor1s race simultaneously started taking shape
as the constituencies began to fall into place.

For ex

ample, during the early stages of the campaign, Treen was
receiving between 18% to 20% of the black and labor vote,
due primarily to Treen’s high name-recognition with these
two groups.

"But, by the time Squier came in, the blacks

and labor were beginning to fall to Lambert - people were
learning about Treen and Fitzmorris and everyone was going
41
back to where they belonged."
Squier decided to maintain the campaign materials de
signed by Carvin.

In addition, he used the theme - 'Louis

iana First, Louis Lambert for Louisiana.' The use of al
literation tends to make the theme memorable and probably
therefore, effective.
all commercials.

The theme was repeated following

This theme was selected as a result of

polling conducted by Hamilton which revealed that citizens
felt Louisiana was not progressing as were other states.
Squier1s series of commercials showed Lambert address
ing a small group of citizens on a variety of issues, such
as energy, inflation and unemployment.

In each spot, the

casually dressed Lambert spoke extemporaneously to a small
gathering of people.

His image was that of a concerned

politician willing to discuss issues with the general pub
lic and

to fight for their particular causes.

In the back

ground of these spots was a small gathering of the audience
Squier was targeting - laborers, farmers, the elderly, etc.
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In addition to the series of thirty-second ads, Squier
began frequent attacks on front-runner Treen's voting
record on social issues.

With approximately one month re

maining until the open primary, Lambert was lodged in fourth
place, behind Hardy, Fitzmbrris and Treen.
The commercials attacking Treen began with the caption,
"Why Dave Treen can't be governor of Louisiana," and con
tinued by attacking his voting record.

"The anti-Treen

„4
spots are to the point, hardhitting and extremely negative."
The main objective of this ad series was to add credibility
to Lambert's image as "the poor man's candidate" and his
concern with the social issues of the state.
Lambert's campaign director stated that the attack on
Treen was to eliminate Paul Hardy from the race.

Since the

conservative Treen was in command of first place, there
was no need to "remind diehards of what a hard-line right
winger Dave Treen is.

Paul Hardy, meanwhile ... is picking

up a lot of conservative support that logically should go
43
to Treen."
Therefore, for Lambert to make the runoff,
he had to surpass Hardy and Fitzmorris.
Lambert's attacks forced Treen to defend his record
"as a fiscally responsible conservative, trying to hold the
line in Washington against the wild freespenders like Lam
bert.

Treen's stirring call to arms brings conservatives
44
flocking even closer to him."
This particular strategy
seemed to have been successful since Hardy's momentum was

reduced and Lambert advanced to the second-place position.
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But with all his strategies and effort, it seems
that Squier was unsuccessful in creating a positive image
of Lambert.

Since the research isolated Lambert's constitu

ency, Squier’s main responsibility was to aim his commercials
to this already supportive audience.

Instead of showing Lam

bert as a passive, respectable candidate of labor and blacks,
he portrayed him as a harsh, loud, rugged candidate.

These

commercials seemed to have unnecessarily angered other seg
ments of the population, particularly the undecided voters
who had yet to decide on the candidate they would support.
"That wasn't the type of guy you wanted to be governor. Those
advertisements were harmful to Lambert’s image because people
felt he was ’mudslinging ... that Lambert's campaign tactics
45
were nauseating and disgusting."
Squier’s usage of negative advertising was not posi
tively received.

Instead of helping Lambert, the ads seemed

to turn voters away from him.

The anti-Treen ads, it ap

pears, were not appropriate for a gubernatorial campaign.
Daniel Bailey, a nationally-known political consultant,
said: "television is a living-room communication vehicle,
and the subject matter, and the approach, and the emotions
that are appropriate in the living-room, are appropriate on
the screen.

But, if they’re not appropriate in the living-

room, they’re not appropriate at all.

46

The initial ads produced by Squier were designed to
portray Lambert as "the poor people's candidate," actively
involved and interested in their needs.

The non-verbal
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messages in these ads may have affected the audience's
perception of Lambert.

In thirteen of the fifteen ads in

which Lambert appeared, he was standing within two or three
feet of from two to fifteen people.

Lambert's close posi

tion to his audience seemed to connote his intimate concern
for the people.

The spatial distance in the ad appeared

to "give a tone to the communication, accent it, and at
times even override the spoken word.

The flow and shift

of distance between people as they interact with each other
47
is part and parcel of the communication process."
Communication theorists have observed that the in
terpersonal distance of two and one-half to four feet is
used when discussing subjects of personal interest and in48
volvement.
In thirteen of the fifteen ads in which Lam
bert appeared, he was involved in the discussion of the
personal interests of his audience.

It has also been

noted that an individual's voice is associated with specifif ranges of distance.

When interacting, the individual's

voice should be soft and the volume low.

In ten of the

fifteen ads, Lambert's voice seemed hostile and unpleasant.
This type of vocal projection would have been more appro
priate had Lambert's audience been standing more than four
feet away.
able.

Prom five feet onward, a full voice is accept

However, by using a full and forceful vocal delivery

while standing two or three feet from an audience, it seems
Lambert was perceived as being an angry and harsh candidate.
Squier's technique of surrounding Lambert with members
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of his target audience appeared effective.

In the eighteen

ads in which this occurred, Lambert seemed to establish di
rect identification with that group of viewers.

These ads

seemed to have strengthened Louis Lambert's association with
groups such as the elderly, blacks, and blue-collar workers.
Lambert also adapted to his audience by the clothes
he wore.

In twelve ads, he appeared in a shirt and tie,

in contrast to the two-piece suits he wore in all of the
ads in Phase I.
Lambert also used numerous gestures while speaking.
In eleven of thirteen ads in which he appeared, Louis
Lambert used gestures to emphasize a point while communi
cating with his audience.

Gestures are most effective

when "they are natural and not affected, when they enhance
49
and harmonize with the verbal message."
He frequently
attempted in a non-intimate manner obtrusively to shake
hands with members of his audience.

This stilted gesture,

coupled with poorly timed back-patting, hinted of insin
cerity on Lambert's part.

His message of wishing to be

close to the people seemed to be ineffectively communicated.
During the week preceding the October 27, 1979, open
primary, a survey was conducted at Louisiana State Univers
ity concerning the gubernatorial campaign.

A formal ques

tionnaire was administered by telephone to a random sample
of Baton Rouge residents to determine the public's opinion
of the gubernatorial candidates.

A section of the study

focused on the public's perception of the major candidates
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in four areas: qualification, honesty, leadership, and
50
intelligence.
Results of the study indicated that Lambert had a neg
ative image in the eyes of the public.

On a scale of one

through five, with one being most positively perceived,
and five being most negatively, Lambert received the lowest
score, a 2.986 and a 3.233 mean value, on the issues of
honesty and qualifications.

The most honest and qualified
51
candidates received scores of 2.417 and 1.92 8.
Lambert was also viewed as the candidate with the poor

est leadership qualities.

He received an average value of

2.986, compared with the high of 1.819.

On the issue of in

telligence, Lambert was viewed by the public as the second
least intelligent candidate, 2.568, compared with the most
52
intelligent candidate's average of 1.917.
Although Squier's ads did properly target Lambert's
constituency and did portray him as being similar to them,
they apparently did not enhance his credibility. The image
Squier created did not seem to project a positive image of
Lambert.

Lambert's constant shouting, his harsh attacks on

his main opponent, and his outwardly aggressive mannerisms
seemed harmful to his overall image.
The official results of the October 27 open primary
placed Louis Lambert in second place, behind frontrunner
53
Dave Treen.
There were various factors which could be
responsible for Lambert's strong finish.

It could have

been Squier's ads, targeted to a well-defined audience.
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Although Lambert's overall image may have been negative,
he was perceived in a positive manner by his targeted con
stituency.
Another factor which probably contributed to Lambert's
second-place finish was the well-organized strategy of Matt
Reese.

During the last two months prior to the campaign,

the Reese organization located and trained 1635 different
people in all parts of the state who volunteered their
assistance on "getting the vote out" on election day. In
addition, Reese located and tested 234 volunteers who helped
with various programs in selected parishes and another 411
volunteers who went from door-to-door in special target
54
precincts.
While the Reese organization was being coordinated in
the field, telephone operators in Baton Rouge and New
Orleans were calling throughout the state.

This operation

resulted in the recruitment of 10,340 block captains and
Lambert leaders, volunteers who go door-to-door or who
agree to call selected voters in their neighborhood.
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Although Lambert did make the runoff, constant image
adjustments and a negatively perceived image proved harmful
throughout the campaign.

His second-place finish was des

cribed by pollster Dan Walker as "an incredible feat, when
you consider the guy started out with one constituency,
shed it, and then found another constituency.
for eight months as a moderate conservative.

He campaigned
Then he pulled

together a labor-black coalition against. Treen."

56

Lambert's
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second place finish can be attributed to the organizational
workings of Matt Reese and his "claritas" operation.

This

sophisticated targeting system seemed effective in identi
fying and persuading Lambert's constituency to vote for
Lambert during the general primary.

The poor image-making

of Carvin and Squier was offset by the effectiveness of
Reese's "behind-the-scenes" organization.
Although Lambert finished second in the open primary,
the offical results were delayed until there was an ex
tensive re-evaluation of the votes cast on October 28. The
unofficial tabulations of the vote by the Associated Press
and United Press International indicated Fitzmorris the
second place finisher.

However, following a recount of

absentee ballots and a retabulation of the votes, Lambert
replaced Fitzmorris for the runoff berth.
The confusion over Lambert's and Fitzmorris' final vote
tabulation was intensified when Fitzmorris filed a suit in
District Court alleging that Lambert won the runoff position
through election fraud in the open primary.

The subsequent

trial proved most harmful to Lambert's campaign.

First,

the legal suit prevented Lambert from campaigning and at
tempting to raise the additional monies required for the
runoff.

Second, his image was tarnished by the suit's

claim of wrongdoing on Lambert's behalf.
Pollster Bill Hamilton noted the suit damaged Lambert's
57
credibility
and that Lambert's behavior during the en
tire episode further weakened his image.

"He acted like a
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dishonest man.

He wouldn't talk to reporters, he wouldn't

try to communicate with them.

He started to shut them out
58
of his campaign, he started to get scared.”
Shortly following final settlement of the suit, Lam
bert was beset with another political obstacle.

The four

major Democratic gubernatorial candidates, Hardy, Mouton,
Henry, and Fitzmorris announced their endorsement of the
Republican candidate, Treen.

Their endorsements seemed to

leave the public with the impression that Lambert was not
a worthy candidate since four Democrats would not support
their fellow Democratic candidate.
The endorsements and the Fitzmorris legal suit, coupled
with an already poor image, placed Lambert in a difficult
position as he prepared for the December 8 general election.
From November 14, following the trial, to November 22,
Squier continued to air negative ads which attacked Treen's
record.

Although such ads may have been responsible for

placing Lambert in the runoff, they were not appropriate
for the general election campaign.

Since the general elec

tion was only twenty days away, Lambert’s organization was
forced to move quickly.

The political situation demanded

that there be instantaneous media capability because of
the new information being received daily.

Because of his

political involvement in campaigns in other states, Squier
began neglecting the Lambert campaign.

This was harmful

to Lambert's campaign, preventing his being able quickly
to react to charges or damaging statements made by his
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opponent.
Rather than addressing the new problems which arose,
such as Lambert's loss of credibility, Squier continued
to air old commercials showing Lambert speaking to citizens
and attacking his opponent - reinforcing the negative image
he received during the open primary.
As a result of his ineffective consulting, Squier was
discharged, replaced by Gus Weill and Raymond Strother of
Baton Rouge.

With only sixteen days remaining before the

election, a poll revealed that Lambert had 23% to 24% of
the vote, compared with Treen's 54%; 32% of the voters
were undecided.
PHASE III
As preparations were made for the final sixteen days
of the campaign, significant circumstances were occurring
behind the scenes.

The cast of players for the Lambert

organization had suddenly changed and the campaign, too,
changed a third time, with Ray Strother assuming the role
of media consultant.

Lambert's staff changed for two

reasons: first, Gillis Long became involved in the campaign
and sent various aides to assist Lambert; and second, Ed
win Edwards also sent aides to help him.

During this time

a member from both Long's and Edward's staff was traveling
with Lambert, so as to give each group access to Lambert.
This constant involvement of Edwards' and Long's staff
in the campaign seemed to cause confusion rather than
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to help and actually was disrupting the Lambert's organi59
zation.
After assuming control of the third phase of Lambert's
campaign, Strother immediately ordered a poll to be taken
by Bill Hamilton "to find out the strengths and weaknesses
of Louis Lambert; where his natural constituency was, what
60
the problems were."
It was his last-minute effort to
change the image of Lambert and to solve his greatest
problem - the lack of credibility.
Strother's poll revealed that blacks and labor were in
support of Lambert, mainly because they had no other can
didate they could ideologically support, so the ads were
targeted to this audience.
The commercials produced by Strother were in direct
contrast to the spots used by Squier.

Strother dressed

Lambert in attractive, conservative suits and had him
speaking directly to the people.

He attempted to show Lam

bert as the underdog, the candidate of the poor people.
In one ad, the comparison was made between Lambert and
Truman, noting that the press and big politicians tried to
defeat Truman and were now trying to defeat Lambert.
Strother also attempted to give Lambert an Edwin Ed
wards image.

Lambert's appearance was similar to that of

Edwards - a handsome man with silver hair.

He had Lambert

make complimentary reference to Edwards and Edwards, in
turn, produced several ads endorsing Lambert.

The purpose

here was to exploit fully the endorsement of the politically
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popular Edwards.
A negative image, however, continued to develop. Lam
bert's appearance, both to live and TV audiences, seemed to
change from that of a strong, firm, and independent leader
to one lacking authority and confidence.

His attempts to

associate himself with Edwards were becoming over exagger
ated; he seemed to suffer from the comparison with Edwards.
Strother knew that Lambert's black and labor support
was not enough - that additional votes must be had for
victory.

He began by changing Lambert’s demeanor, "not

allowing him to be angry, dressing him very well, having
him sit in front of the camera.

He wanted him to look in

to the lens of the camera because a candidate can gain cred61
ibility by looking at his constituency.
In new commercials Strother "stripped away all the
trimmings ... because we thought it was coming off a little
62
fake."
Lambert's new image was to be that of a passive,
nice man.

"We wanted to show the public that Lambert wasn’t

a bad, mean mobster.
an attractive man.

He's like you, he's not angry, he's
63
He looks like a governor."

This description of the candidate seemed to have been
effectively communicated to electorate in three thirtysecond ads.

They showed Lambert seated in a white chair,

with a "homey" look provided by a table lamp and a picture.
Lambert spoke in a low, mild tone - a complete contrast
to his vocal delivery in the commercials of Phase II - and
his non-verbal messages were minimal and subtle.

Altogether
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the new ads were effective in portraying Lambert as a com
passionate, honest and genteel candidate.
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CHAPTER V
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LAMBERT'S POLITICAL COMMERCIALS
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VERBAL CONTENT
In the communication process, a central position is oc
cupied by the content.

Communication content represents

the information which one person or group communicates to
another.

Communication content contains such a vast

quantity of valuable human experience that a single sys
tem of substantive categories cannot describe it.

However,

a scientific method exists which does describe various
facets of content in summary form.

This method is called

content analysis - a research technique for the objective,
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest
1
content of communication.
Wright suggests three reasons why it is advisable to
2
study systematically the content of communications.
First, despite the high frequency of exposure to media con
tent, the experience of each individual is limited and se
lective.

Second, these individuals tend to over-generalize

from their particular communication experiences, thereby
obtaining a distorted picture of reality.

Finally, during

the everyday exposure to communications content, recipi
ents are seldom motivated to analyze meaningful aspects of
the communication.
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Most discussion of content analysis dealing with the
purposes, uses, and functions of the technique concern them
selves with distinguishing between three areas: descriptions
of the texts of communication, attempts to draw inferences
from the texts as to their antecedents, and attempts to
3
draw inferences from the texts as to their effects.
A sophisticated use of content analysis couples it
with additional information about source, channel, receiver,
or feedback.

It could also include conditions such as at

titude, personality or demographic characteristics.

From

this, predictions concerning the communication process can
be made.

In this case "content analysis is a tool used

with other methods of inquiry to link message content with
other parts of the communicative process." ^
Although the emphasis of content analysis is upon the
message, concern is given to developing information con
cerning the sender and receiver of the message.

The an

alysis of content that can develop information regarding the
initiator and recipient of the message while investigating
the message is the basic assumption of the technique. Berelson lists three other assumptions of the technique which de
fine this basic assumption.
Berelson states that content analysis assumes that in
ferences between intent and content or between content and
effect can be validly made, or that actual relationships
can be established.

He also argues that content analysis

assumes that the study of manifest content is meaningful.

93

This assumption requires that the same meaning be imparted
by the message to the communicator, communicatee, and analyst.
Finally, content analysis assumes that quantitative descrip
tion of content, such as frequency of occurrence of symbols
5
or words, is meaningful.
THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY
Validity is concerned with how the findings of the
study relate to some measure of the actual or reality. Berelson notes that content analysis dealing with material which
is more manifest than latent will be more valid. He further
states that validity in a content analysis is not usually a
problem if a careful definition of the categories and altern
ative selections of indicators is performed. Validity is high
where agreement exists on the definition of relevant categories.

Every effort was made to define the list of categories

for this study by using an established checklist.^
George recognizes that one way to check the accuracy
of the inferences of content analysis is by an internal
check on the logic and plausibility of the reasoning.
Another way to check the accuracy of the inferences is by
evaluating the degree of confirmation enjoyed by the gener8
alizations used in support of the specific inferences.
THE PROBLEM OF RELIABILITY
Reliability is a measure of how the results of a
content analysis compare with a re-analysis by a second
analyst or group of analysts, or between a present and sub-
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sequent analysis by the same individual.

The disagreement

among different analysts frequently determines the amount
of error of particular measurement, and, therefore, con
stitutes the problem of reality.

Moreover, reliability

is a measure of consistency among analysts or through time.
Different coders should produce the same results when ap
plying the same set of categories to the same content. Or,
a single coder or group of coders should produce the same
results when they apply the same categories to the same
9
content at different times.
Reliability is a function of the precision in which
the rules of content analysis are set up and the ease with
which the discriminations can be made between types of
content specified by the rules.

When assertions are eval

uated, there is a need for reliability to be measured. The
analyst is forced to make subtle distinctions that a meas
ure of reliability is needed to show whether or not certain
cases are inconsistently coded, thus causing worthless re10
suits.
TYPE-TOKEN RATIO AND HUMAN-INTEREST TEST
A series of tests were employed to determine the over
all effectiveness of the verbal messages Lambert communi
cated to the electorate. The type-token ratio was used
to measure the variability in Lambert's working vocabulary,
with the scores based on the number of different words found
11
in samples of standard length.
This test indicates the
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verbal clarity of the message presented.

A human-interest

test is another method used to determine the clarity of the
verbal message.

This test examines the interest level of

the message and

enables one to judge the speech on a scale

ranging from dull to interesting to dramatic.
In each phase, Lambert used three different deliveries
in communicating his policital messages.

In Phase I, he

memorized from a prepared script his message to be deliv
ered on television.
extemporaneously.

In Phase II, he delivered all messages
Finally, Lambert read from a cue card

the advertisement copy in Phase III.
The two tests employed reveal which of the three meth
ods of presenting the message was clearest and most effect
ive.

The type-token ratio provided the opportunity to test

the clarity of Lambert's messages.
vertisement is as follows:
Phase III 7.09.

The ratio for each ad

Phase I 7.26, Phase II 6.8,

The type-token scale indicates that the

closer the number is to one, the more elementary and more
simplified is the message.

The scores reveal the three

messages were relatively equal in terms of degree of clar
ity, but that their verbal content was not presented in
the clearest possible manner, considering the audience to
which the message was geared.

Although different methods

of delivery were employed in each phase, the level of
their clarity remained consistent.
The human-interest test allows the researcher to de
termine the interest-level of the message presented.
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Scores ranging from 0-5 are considered "dull," from 6-30,
12
"interesting," and from 31-80, dramatic.
Results of
the human interest test reveals: Phase I, 41.9; Phase II,
36.7; Phase III, 46.1.

Accordingly, the verbal messages

Lambert communicated could be considered "interesting."
The type of delivery for each phase is significant.

Phase

III ads, in which Lambert read from a cue card, were viewed
as the most interesting, followed closely by the memorized
script used in Phase I.

His extemporaneous delivery, in

Phase II, rated the least interesting of the three ads.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VISUAL CONTENT
In modern day American society the political aspirant
has abundant opportunity to develop and structure his image,
especially through the use of television, generally consid
ered the most powerful communications medium.

Consequently,

the politican must be ever conscious of how the TV viewing
public is perceiving him - the type of image he projects.
Political television, which allows presentation of
the image of a politician, in turn, provides the viewer
with visible clues to the politician's character and per13
sonality.
The influential non-verbal content in a tele
vised political advertisement is the means frequently used
for projecting the candidate's image.

"When the verbal

and non-verbal content of television material come into
conflict with each other, it may be certainly predicted
that the lasting effects on the viewer are likely to be
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those of the non-verbal elements exclusively, the imagery
of television that stems from the presentation techniques
producers use."

14

Dan Nimmo argues that the visual message

has a greater effect on total impressions than the verbal
message.

"What the candidate says is less significant than
15
how they look. Style, not content, prevails."
The objective elements of political television, such

as camera framing, camera angle, juxtaposition, form part
of the basis along which television advertisement pictures
are perceived.

According to research on this topic, the

influence of television is primarily in the picture and
secondarily in the accompanying language.

Baggeley and

Duck's experiments confirm the influence of the non-verbal
aspect of political advertisements:

"the simple visual

imagery of television production actually dominates its
16
verbal content."
The 1979 gubernatorial campaign served as a testing
ground for examining television's influence in shaping
the electorate’s perceptions.

Public opinion generally

blamed Lambert's defeat on four Democrats' endorsement of
a Republican challenger.

Others attributed it to the detri

mental effect of Lambert's court proceedings with challeng
er James Fitzmorris and

still others think the cause was

the negative image Lambert projected during his campaign.
Those closest to Lambert's actual campaign suggest
his loss was in great part due to ineffective use of the
media; that inept media advisors caused him to undergo
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three different image changes during the six month campaign.
The extent to which Lambert's political television advertise
ments formed and

re-formed his image invites analysis/

with attention given the possible subtle influences of
television that are unique among the media.
The framing of an image or scene by the television
camera creates a visual field.

The elements arranged

within this defined space, the context or sequencing of
the visual image, the dynamics of movement within the
frame, and the images all interact to create a meaningful
17
visual message for the viewer.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze systematical
ly the visual content of the televised advertisements of
Louis Lambert and to determine his portrayal by that medium.
Previous limited research in visual communication and prin
ciples of film and television aethetics are used as bases
for analyzing the visual content.
Using visual recordings of Lambert's advertisements,
eight categories were set-up to chart the visual content
of each advertisement.

The form devised for the coding in

cluded the following factors:
ject movement; 3.

1.

Camera framing; 2.

Eye contact of speaker with camera;

Eye contact of speaker with audience; 5.

Sub
4.

Facial expression

of candidate; 6.

Facial expression of audience; 7. Verti18
cal camera angle; 8. Number of shots per advertisement.
Since the data represents the total population of shots

rather than a sample of the shots, statistical tests were not

99

necessary.

To verify the reliability of the data, however,

several tests were conducted by independent coders.

In each

instance, the data measured in seconds, showed discrepancies
of less than 2.5 seconds.

Since the coders were dealing in

hundreds of seconds, this 2.5 precision can be considered
insignificant and, thereby, did not contaminate the study.
CAMERA FRAMING
Camera framing can intensify the candidate's visual
image by directing the viewer's attention to the eventful
details or by giving the image greater detail.

Indeed,

empirical research gives limited support for this proposi
tion.

Alyward, for example, found that viewers expressed

a more favorable attitude toward the use of certain shots,
19
particularly close-ups.
A "shot" is "the interval between two distinct video
transmissions, frame splice to splice, or from cut to cut,
20
disolve or wipe."
While a television ad is perceived as a
whole, it is composed of various elements. The altering of
these individual elements would, theoretically, have an effect
21
upon the perception of the whole presentation.
The camera frame is an isolating device which enables
the director to confer special attention on what otherwise
might be overlooked in a wider context.

22

Close-up, medium,

and long shots were those traditionally used in Lambert's ad
vertisements.

Each merits certain emphasis.

The audience is better able to observe the facial ex
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pressions and subtle nuances when the camera is drawn
closer to the subject.

The close-up shot "stimulates an
23
empathetic response on the part of the viewer."
Gerald
Milierson says that close-up shots emphasize the subject's
strength and importance, while the inclusion of longer
shots tends to cause drops in tension and subject import24
ance.
Other studies contend that the use of the closeup shot has no significant effect upon interest level, re
gardless of where employed.

The use of the long shot re

sults in a decline in the audience's interest level when25
ever employed.
Significant differences in camera framing were observed
in each phase of Lambert's campaign.

In Phase I, eight

advertisements totaling 278 seconds showing Lambert were
aired.

Lambert was framed in a medium shot (waist to knee)

227.1 seconds or 27.1% of the time.

During only 33.9

seconds or 12.2% of the time was Lambert framed at his mid
torso and only 17 seconds or 6.1% of the time was Lambert
framed in a close-up shot.

In Phase II, of the 515 seconds

of advertisements featuring Lambert, 247.7 seconds or 48.1%
of the shots were framed at the waist-mid torso, 156 seconds
or 30.3% of the shots were close-ups, while 52.7 seconds
or 10.7% were devoted on extreme close-up.
of the time, Lambert was not shown.

During 11.4%

Finally, during all

90 seconds of the Phase III ads in which Lambert appeared,
the traditional long shot-medium shot-close-up sequence
prevailed.

65.2 seconds or 72.4% of the advertisement
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relied primarily on the close-up framing.
Carvin's extensive usage of the loose shot in Phase
I seemed effective by allowing appropriate background to
be seen with each political message.

The loose shot also

allowed the audience to view Lambert walking because "mo26

tion is the strongest appeal to attention."
Squier employed the medium shot predominantly through
out Phase II.

The main purpose of this framing was also

to show Lambert standing closely with his targeted constit
uents, namely blue-collar, black, and the needy.

Weill

and Strother relied on the "slow zoom" shot, with a focus
on the close-up shot.

The political messages of the Phase

III advertisements apparently proved more difficult to
match to appropriate settings, so these messages were given
with a background consisting of a lamp and picture.
The persuasive emphasis on the various backgrounds is
noteworthy.

The media consultants' inclusion of specific

backgrounds in framing the shots must be analyzed.

A study

by Baggaley and Duck examined the effects of adding a back27

ground to a production.

They discovered that, presented

against a picture background, a speaker was perceived as
more profound, honest, reliable, and fair than when seen
against a plain background.

They continue that the back

ground selected for a political advertisement "may conse
quently exude implications far more extensive than ever
the producer imagines."

28

Carvin's decision to use the

Wall Street, Three Mile Island, and Geneva background for
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Lambert's initial campaign messages may have appeared to
be a unique technique.

However, the public's negative

reaction and vocal disapproval of the advertisements as
"wasteful" spelled disaster for Phase I.

It seems that

the emphasized background, made obvious by the looseframing and the continual references made during the ad
vertisement, was responsible for the negative image Lam
bert projected during the early stage of his campaign.
Squier relied, in Phase II, on reaction shots of the
audience as the background.

However, during 155 of the

255 seconds, or 60.8% which included a personal background,
the audience appeared either bored, uninterested, or unim
pressed with Lambert's message.

Studies by Baggeley and

Duck reveal these negative reaction shots of the audience
could be viewed "as more confusing, more shallow, and more
29
inexpert."
Even though background shots are not an es
sential part of the discourse, they can represent the in
terest value of the candidates message.

Past studies re

flect the persuasiveness of background shots.

The in

sertion of favorable reactions may substantially increase
the motivational value of the taped message.

The possible

negative influence on the viewer's reaction to a speaker
30
may outweigh any benefits to be derived.
In Phase II,
Lambert's message was clear and appropriately aimed toward
his target audience.

However, the negative reactions of

the audience to Lambert's message seemed to outweigh its
positive impact, resulting in the image of Lambert as un-
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interesting.
VERTICAL CAMERA PLACEMENT
Directors in television manipulate the visual content
in an attempt to focus audience attention and elicit par
ticular responses.

A well-documented principle of tele

vision aesthetics is that the vertical camera placement can
influence the importance or dominance of the photographed
31
individual.
Livingston suggests that the camera angle
may affect the audience’s psychological reaction.

"The

angle of a shot has a marked influence on the audience's
psychological reaction to the subject matter photographed.
As demonstrated ... angles shooting upward cause the sub
ject to appear stronger, more powerful than the audience,
while angles shooting downward give the audience a feeling
32
of strength and make the subject appear weaker."
The role of camera angle is also referred to as the
principle of dominance.

According to Bretz, if a person

is looking up at an object, the object takes on a greater
importance than the viewer.

"We feel we are figuratively

as well as actually 'looking up' to it.

Conversely, if

the camera shoots down on someone, he is less important
33
than we are."
The angle from which a subject is photographed de
termines much of its meaning.

Empirical studies revealed

that as the camera angle moved from high through medium
to low, the ratings of the model improved.

Furthermore,
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individuals were judged more active or potent if the person
was photographed from a slightly low angle and

if the per34
son engaged in at least a slight amount of activity.
Various camera angles can also influence the audience

impression of a candidate's credibility.

Research findings

indicate that the high angle shot can raise a televised
figure's credibility. This does not mean, however, that the
mere inclusion of a few high angle shots will increase
credibility.
The designation of each angle is determined on the
basis of where the camera is placed in relationship to the
subject.

In the three phases of the campaign, virtually

all shots were judged as being at eye-level, but subtle
differences in camera angles were difficult to determine.
Eye-level shots depend on the eye of the beholder.

Al

though not immediately remarkable, the eye-level shot can
35
have significant effect over the course of the film. In
only one 60 second advertisement in Phase II did the di
rector employ a low angle shot.

The decision to employ

eye-level shots placed the audience viewer "on equal footing
36
with the subject, implying a sense of parity."
The directors in each phase opted to present Lambert
as an equal with his targeted audience.

This selection of

camera angle appears effective, considering Lambert's strat
egy of identification with various audiences.

The use of

a lower angle would have separated Lambert from his public.
Rather than appearing on the level of his public, Lambert
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could have been negatively created as one with a sense of
dominance over his viewers.
SUBJECT PLACEMENT
In his works on television aesthetics, Herbert Zettl
suggests that the placement and movement of objects affects
a viewer's perception of that object.
Zettl's concept is
37
called "asymmetry of the screen."
There is general
agreement that the right and left sides of a visual field
are perceived differently.

Studies by Millerson suggest

that a preference for the right side of the screen results
from a right-handed cultural bias.

38

The filmmaker will

often exploit this psychological phenomenon to reinforce
his idea.
There are those who argue that the left side place
ment is more effective.

Since the eye tends to read a

picture from left to right, "physical movement in this
direction seems psychologically natural, whereas movement
from right to left often seems inexplicably tense and un39
comfortable."
According to Mercedes Gaffron, the ob
server experiences a picture as if he were facing its left
side.

The viewer will, therefore, subjectively identify

with the left side and will attach greater importance to
whatever appears there.

He continues:

"The audience is

inclined to look to its left first and to identify with
the character appearing on that side ... the left side is
considered the stronger.

The one farthest left dominates
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the scene.”40
The screen placement of Lambert in Phases I and II
was particularly noteworthy.

in Phase I , Lambert was

positioned on the right side of the screen 35.7% of the
time, on the left side 31.6% of the time, and in the cen
ter of the screen 32.7% of the time.

In each placement,

Lambert was walking from right to left, left to right, or
center to camera.

The directors' choice for photograph

ing these various movements seem to suggest psychological
implications.

The shots of Lambert starting from the left

and walking to the right is a natural movement for the
viewer's eyes.

Whereas, the movement from right to left

may be seen "as overcoming stronger resistance; it pushes
41
against the current, instead of drifting with it."
The
shots of Lambert walking to the camera, on the other hand,
seem

friendly,

inviting.

Lambert is attempting to move

closer and become more open with his audience.
In Phase II, Lambert was positioned on the left side
of the screen 32.5% of the time, on the right side 37.0%
of the time, and centered in the middle of the screen 19.1%
of the time.

These various positions also seem to suggest

similar implications as discussed previously.

The more

natural and, consequently, more effective positioning of
Lambert were the shots positioning him on the left side of
the screen.
Finally, in Phase III Lambert was positioned in the
center of the screen with the camera moving slowing from a
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medium shot to a close-shot.

This technique seems to

position Lambert as being on the same level and as being
near his audience, once again attempting to project a
friendly, personal image.
It seems that the positioning of Lambert on the
left side of the screen and walking toward the right is
the more effective technique because this "natural move
ment" of the candidate is more pleasing to the viewer.
Subsequently, this technique may have a psycologically
pleasing affect on the viewer.

More research, however,

is needed to better determine the effectiveness of the
varying techniques.
EYE CONTACT
A candidate's appearance may be amplified or minimized
by his use of eye contact with the camera.

A speaker's

eye contact with his audience can serve as a measure of
42
his liking of his audience.
There are conflicting find
ings in eye contact research concerning an individual's
effectiveness when employing direct eye contact with the
camera.
Since 1960, a variety of studies have supported the
concept that direct eye-contact in television content is
a powerful technique.

On the other hand, findings by Bag-

geley and Duck suggest that an audience attaches greater
reliability and expertise to the half-profile image as
43
opposed to the front eye-contact image.
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In Phase I, Lambert maintained direct eye contact
with the camera for 201 seconds or 72.3% of the time. His
direct eye contact seemed to personalize his message, to
make him appear to be communicating with the public on a
one-to-one level.
In Phase II, on the other hand, Lambert maintained
minimal eye contact with the viewing audience.

Rather, he

concentrated on focusing his message toward those members
in the advertisement.

During Phase II, Lambert maintained

eye-contact with his immediate audience 85.6% of the time.
This type of eye-contact seemed sincere' and natural as the
viewing audience observed Lambert communicating with the
electorate.
The Phase III advertisements resorted back to the
direct eye-contact technique.

The "talking head" shots again

projected Lambert as speaking directly to the voting public.
A study by Raban concluded that in the half-profile
condition, significantly higher ratings of the speaker's
reliability and expertise were obtained.

On the rating

scales, the half-profile condition drew more favorable
44
ratings than the direct-to-camera condition.
Studies also revealed that the disruptive effects of
speaking to a camera do not give the important feedback
that is customary in mornal interaction.

Baggaley and

Duck contend that the full face shot actually leads to
less favorable assessments of the speaker.

On the other

hand, Raban argues that "the directness of the straight
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address to a camera is factual and authoritative, whereas,
a speaker framed in half-profile, talking away from the
45
camera is likely to appear less so."
Overall, significant
ly more favorable ratings were obtained in the half-pro
file condition.

The half-profile condition drew more

favorable ratings than the direct condition, even though
differences between the two approaches were not always
46
statistically significant.
In the campaign philosophy of having Lambert communi
cate directly with the people,- it seems difficult to con
clude which technique most effectively complimented his
attempts to project the more positive image with his view
ing audience.

In different situations either technique,

the direct eye contact or the half-profile, may prove more
effective in assisting Lambert in projecting a positive
image.

Additional research should further investigate

the impact of these tactical questions which may enhance
the candidates televised image.
VOCAL AND FACIAL COES
Lambert's vocal and facial expressions appear to have
influenced the audience's perception of him.

Mebrabian’s

experimental research concluded that when the liking of a
source is at issue, the relative impact of discrepant
verbal, vocal and facial cues were as follows: total
liking = 7% verbal liking + 38% vocal liking, + 55% facial
47
liking.
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A speaker communicating via television should trans
mit warmth, enthusiasm, vitality, poise, confidence and
directness.

These intangibles are frequently received

through subtle, non-verbal cues and are frequently re
ceived at the peripheral or subliminal level by the
48
viewer.
Many negative intangible qualities seemingly
were transmitted through Lambert's non-verbal cues.
Lambert's facial expression was viewed as an important
factor in the way he was perceived by his audience. In
dependent coders rated Lambert's facial expression as
either friendly, natural, or angry.
In Phase I, Lambert's facial expression communicated
calmness and sincere interest during 254 seconds or 91.4%
of the shot.

During 24.0 seconds or 8.6%, he smiled and

appeared happy.

In contrast, Phase II showed Lambert ap

pearing serious, harsh, or angry during 391 seconds or
85.7% of the time, as opposed to being shown as a relaxed
candidate 14.3% of the time.
trayed him an angry candidate.

His facial expression por
In Phase III, Lambert's

facial expression during all 90 seconds was that of calm
ness and interest.
Lambert's vocal expression parallel his facial ex
pression.

In those ads where Lambert appeared harsh,

serious, or angry, his vocal qualities seemed to support
his facial expression.

In those where he appeared relaxed,

calm, and interested, his vocal qualities matched his
facial expression.

Research suggests that the separate
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aspects of a person’s performance may conflict, and his
voice may be the main determinant of favorable reaction to
49
him, while his visual appearance was less favorable.
Lambert's vocal cues seemed to distract from his
message because of his harsh, over-serious and loud vocal
delivery.

His failure to vocalize in a pleasing manner

prevented his increasing listener interest.

Consequently,

he projected an image that was perceived negatively.
NUMBER OF SHOTS PER AD
Research has dealt

with the problem of how often to

change shots in an advertisement.

Aylward found that a

dynamic style of editing is superior to a static style in
50
terms of information gained.
Ellery found that in terms
of interest expressed by the viewer, the program shot with
only a medium close-up was favored over the program which
51
used loose-shots, medium-shots, and close-up shots.
Finally, Jaspen found that the less visually diverse
presentations were superior to the presentations containing
52
more shots in terms of information gained.
These stud
ies have determined that a camera using just one shot is
more effective than the multiple camera technique.
In Phase I, an average of three shots per advertise
ment was presented.

Phase II averaged approximately 3.2

shots per advertisement and Phase III used just one shot
per ad.

Based on the research conducted, it appears the

shot selection for Phase III was most effective because the
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viewer was able to focus clearly on the dominant image
being projected.

In contrast, the use of multiple shots

in Phase I and II probably impeded achievement of the
desired image.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The end of Edwin Edwards1 two-term reign as governor
of Louisiana opened the road for an intense campaign to
elect his successor.

Six well known Louisiana politicians

and office holders announced their intention to seek
Louisiana's highest political position.
Louis Lambert's gubernatorial campaign began early
in 1979.

His early announcement was supported with ad

vanced planning by his campaign staff, including the care
ful selection of a media consultant.

The other candidates

for the office also enlisted the aid of nationally prom
inent media advisors.

As a result, the Louisiana voters

were witnessed a massive political campaign conducted pri
marily via television.
Since 1964, the employment of media consultants for
political campaigns has proved to be vital to candidates
success.

The consultants' importance has been considered

equal to that of campaign manager or chief funder.
The media manager must be artist and business
man all at once. He must be able, to shoot
films in 30 or 90 seconds, or five minutes,
that catch the voice that gives his candidate
nobility, force, regular-fellowship or states
manship. He must know how to edit this film,
know where to buy the time slot, and precisely
what local or network audience he hopes to reach the earnest citizen, common slob or union man.1
Louis Lambert fully appreciated the role of the media
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consultants and began his campaign by hiring Jim Carvin
of New Orleans, Louisiana, successful and widely experi
enced in his field.

Midway through the campaign, however,

Carvin was dismissed and replaced by another successful
media consultant, Robert Squier of Washington, D. C.
Near the end of the race, Squier also was discharged and
replaced by Gus Weill and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge,
who completed Lambert's campaign.
Lambert's consultants relied almost exclusively on
television for communicating their message, and, as it
developed, projected different images of Lambert to the
people.-

Squier, in addition to using television extensive

ly, also relied on sophisticated polling and phone banks
for communicating to the electorate about Lambert.
The work of Lambert's and the other candidates' media
consultants in the 1979 gubernatorial campaign gave the
Louisiana electorate vast amounts of information on the
aspirants for the office.

Through the medium of television

they obtained a detailed picture of each candidate - his
appearance, mannerisms, gestures, voice quality and artic
ulateness.

. Besides these personal attributes, the voters

were exposed, via television, to the candidates' knowledge
of and interest in significant issues affecting the state
and its people and to make personal estimates of their sin
cerity, ability and other qualities.

On the candidates'

side, the campaign gave Lambert and the others a channel
for projecting a positive image that could translate into
votes.
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According to a poll conducted by Samuel Lubell, the
overwhelming majority responded that they were more in
terested in how the televised candidates looked and handled
2
themselves, rather than issues. His survey analysis re
vealed that once viewers found themselves unable to cope
with the issues, they settled back and judged the candi
date as in a personality contest.

This finding fitted

the 1979 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign also, for in it
personalities and images apparently over-rode issues.
Further research by Michael Rothchild, prominent
political communication researcher, lends support to the
authors conclusion.

It appeared that Lambert was engaged

in a low involvement capaign.

According to Rothchild,

three factors must be present in a low involvement campaign:
the issues are not volatile, one candidate has a substantial
3
lead over his opponent, and it is not a national election.
When a candidate, such as Lambert, is engaged in a
low involvement campaign, there are strategies he can in
corporate into his campaign.

Rothchild's low involvement

model is applicable to Lambert's situation.

Since Lambert

was in second place in the general primary and since the
issues were not volatile, he would probably have been more
effective had he focused on a competitively consistent
image rather than undergoing numerous image changes. Con
versely, Treen employed a consistent and repetitive image
throughout his campaign.

Rothchild's research tends to

imply that Treen's success can be attributed to his main-
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taining a consistent image.

However, Lambert's defeat

can be blamed, in part, on his inability to establish a
clear and consistent image.
Image-making appeared to be an influential factor
in Louis Lambert's pursuit of voter support.

During each

phase of the campaign, the media consultant of the time
attempted to project a Lambert that would be positively
perceived by the electorate.
In Phase I of his campaign Jim Carvin portrayed
Lambert as conservative and flamboyant.
much criticism early in the campaign.

Lambert received
A reason for such

scrutiny was a result of his early announcement to seek
the office of governor.

By beginning his campaign approx

imately five months earlier than the other five candidates,
Lambert may have encountered the problem of overexposure.
Saturation seems to have an educational effect, making
voters more sophisticated about what they see.

According

to media consultant Raymond Strother, when a candidate
appears in a political commercial, "people can either like
you, dislike you, or they can be indifferent. But, if you
start real early, you are giving people more of an oppor4
tunity to dislike you." Lambert's early start may have
caused people to formulate opinions of Lambert before they
could judge him in light of the other candidates.

Once

the remaining candidates announced they were to seek the
governorship, many voters had either eliminated Lambert or
formulated a negative image of him.
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Garvin's decision to place Lambert in different parts
of the country further damaged Lambert's image.

Although

the Three Mile Island, Geneva, and Wall Street commercials
did focus on timely issues, the setting prompted waves of
criticism which proved harmful to the campaign.
Carvin's spots did not improve Lambert's fifth place
standing in the polls and resulted in Carvin's dismissal.
Robert Squier assumed the role as Lambert's media consul
tant.

Squier joined the Lambert organization in September,

1979, and enlisted the aid of pollster Bill Hamilton and
campaign organizer Matt Reese.

These three men worked

together and remained in constant communication prior to
the production of any shot.

Before any commercial was pro

duced, Hamilton conducted research to determine the target
ed audience.
II.

This advance research seemed the key to Phase

The research indicated that the commercials should

focus on laborers and blacks.

"Those identified as upper-

middle class were left alone ... we would confirm those
who were for Lambert and work on them hard by use of phone
5
banks, mailings, voter contact programs."
This type of
organization seems to have been more influential than the
advertisements Squier produced.
Since the research isolated Lambert's constituency,
Squier's main responsibility was to aim his commercials at
this already supportive audience.

Instead of improving

Lambert's image with his targeted audience and the un
decided voters, Squier showed Lambert as a harsh, angry,
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rugged candidate.

In addition to creating a negative

image of Lambert, Squier also angered segments of the
electorate with his commercials.
Although Lambert did make the runoff, the image Squier
created for Lambert was not the main reason for the second
place finish.

Rather, it seemed that the "behind the

scenes" work of Reese and Hamilton provided the margin of
victory.

Lambert's angry messages and attack on Treen's

record tarnished his overall image.

Lambert alienated and

offended voters who would remember his negative image during
the runoff.
With only sixteen days until the runoff election,
Squier was fired and replaced by Raymond Strother.

The

commercials produced by Strother contrasted with the Phase
I and Phase II commercials.

Strother attempted to show

Lambert as the underdog, the candidate of the poor. He
attempted to change Lambert's image by not allowing him to
be angry.

"We wanted to show the public that Lambert wasn't

a bad, mean monster. He's like you; he's not angry, he's
6
an attractive man. He looks like a governor."
Strother also associated the Democratic candidate with
outgoing governor Edwin Edwards.

However, continued at

tempts to make this association seemed to harm Lambert's
image because they suggested he was lacking leadership.
Lambert's repeated references to Edwards implied that he
was not independent but rather a model of Edwards.

This con

tinued association with Edwards may have tarnished the com-
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petent image Strother strove to create.
In conclusion, image-making appeared to be an influ
ential factor in Lambert's pursuit of voter support.

The

image Lambert projected through his televised political ad
vertisements did not strengthen his candidacy.

The image

Lambert communicated was not a positive factor in his cam
paign.

His negative image, however, was an important factor

which served to weaken his candidacy. Had Lambert conducted
a positive image-making campaign, he may have been more
successful in his quest for the governorship of Louisiana.
Image-making is important in a political campaign.
Image-making alone, however, does not win campaigns. Rath
er, a campaign also needs good organization and the proper
campaign strategy.

In Lambert's case, his organization ap

peared unsettled throughout the campaign.

There were fre

quent organizational shake-ups and re-evaluated strategies.
Such campaign confusion seemed to harm Lambert's candidacy
because his organization frequently changed its intended
course of action.
Lambert's campaign, however, did make effective use
of phone banks.

This sophisticated campaign technique

seems responsible for Lambert's strong voter support in
the two primaries.

The phone banks seemed successful in

targeting voters and persuading those to vote on election
day.
Lambert's black and labor support can also be a
reason for his strong finish.

The impact of the bloc
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vote is still undetermined.

However, it is the view of

this writer that the labor and black vote is powerful in
the selection of public leaders.
The total effect of political commercials is still
unknown.

Television political advertising's effect on

voting behavior has produced no concrete conclusions as
to whether it may increase the vote or have no effect what
ever on the electorate.

New research is needed to deter

mine the influence of political advertisements on voters.
With various communication media (i.e. radio, newspaper,
direct mail) working in conjunction with television, it
is difficult to assess the complete impact of television
political advertisements on the electorate.
Further research is also needed in the area of tele
vision aesthetics in political advertisements.

Conflicting

and limited research contend that certain camera techniques
are more effective than others.

With politicians' heavy

dependence upon television in campaigning, a better under
standing of the effectiveness of various television tech
niques is mandatory.

A certain camera technique may have

subtle psychological influences unknown to media consul
tants.

These psychological influences of television

whether positively or negatively affecting a political
advertisement, need further examination.
Finally, additional research should investigate the
influence of news reporting regarding the political can
didate.

The news accounts could alter a candidate's image.
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Also, future research should examine the effectiveness of
the targeting of commercials to insure that each commercial
is reaching the intended audience.
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